Home > Articles > Operating Systems, Server > Solaris

  • Print
  • + Share This
Like this article? We recommend

How to Use the Tools

This section provides samples of how to use each of the tools covered in the "Tools" section. We provide sample output and tips on interpreting the results. Use this information with the sample attack scenarios in the "Techniques" section.

Using Port Scanners

To demonstrate the capabilities of the Nmap port scanner, we ran the following scan. The output of the scan reveals the services running on the machine. Nmap's ability to identify the OS running on the system is particularly useful because it can significantly reduce the time required to launch a successful attack against the machine.

Based on the Nmap results, this system appears to be a fully loaded Solaris 2.6 or 7 OE system running most of the default services.

The Nmap output is as follows:

# /usr/local/nmap -O ganassi

Starting nmap V. 2.53 (http://www.insecure.org/nmap/)
Interesting ports on ganassi (10.8.10.231):
(The 1515 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
Port    State    Service
7/tcp   open    echo
9/tcp   open    discard
13/tcp   open    daytime
19/tcp   open    chargen
21/tcp   open    ftp
23/tcp   open    telnet
25/tcp   open    smtp
37/tcp   open    time
79/tcp   open    finger
111/tcp  open    sunrpc
512/tcp  open    exec
513/tcp  open    login
514/tcp  open    shell
515/tcp  open    printer
540/tcp  open    uucp
1103/tcp  open    xaudio
4045/tcp  open    lockd
6112/tcp  open    dtspc
7100/tcp  open    font-service
32771/tcp open    sometimes-rpc5
32772/tcp open    sometimes-rpc7
32773/tcp open    sometimes-rpc9
32774/tcp open    sometimes-rpc11
32775/tcp open    sometimes-rpc13
32776/tcp open    sometimes-rpc15
32777/tcp open    sometimes-rpc17
32778/tcp open    sometimes-rpc19

Remote operating system guess: Solaris 2.6 - 2.7
Uptime 0.054 days (since Wed Sep 12 09:41:59 2001)

Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 37 seconds

Using Vulnerability Scanners

To demonstrate the capabilities of the Nessus vulnerability scanner, we ran the following scan.

The command in our example runs a Nessus scan against the hosts listed in targetfile and stores the output in outfile:

# nessus -T text localhost 1241 noorder targetfile outfile

The Nessus output begins with a summary of the scan results:

Nessus Scan Report
------------------

SUMMARY

 - Number of hosts which were alive during the test : 1
 - Number of security holes found : 2
 - Number of security warnings found : 15
 - Number of security notes found : 1

TESTED HOSTS

 192.168.0.90 (Security holes found)

The output continues with details for each of the security warnings found. The following is an excerpt from the output:

DETAILS

+ 192.168.0.90 :
 . List of open ports :
  - unknown (161/udp) (Security hole found)
  - unknown (32779/udp) (Security warnings found)
  - unknown (32775/tcp) (Security warnings found)
  - unknown (32776/udp) (Security warnings found)
  - unknown (32778/udp) (Security warnings found)
  - unknown (32774/udp) (Security hole found)
  - unknown (32777/udp) (Security warnings found)
  - unknown (32780/udp) (Security warnings found)
  - unknown (32775/udp) (Security warnings found)
  - lockd (4045/udp) (Security warnings found)
  - unknown (32781/udp) (Security hole found)

. Vulnerability found on port unknown (32774/udp) :

  The sadmin RPC service is running.
  There is a bug in Solaris versions of
  this service that allow an intruder to
  execute arbitrary commands on your system.

  Solution : disable this service
  Risk factor : High

Using this output, hackers from our example scenarios ("Techniques") gain access to the system.

In addition to other vulnerabilities, the following "denial of service" (DoS) vulnerability appears in the output:

DETAILS

. List of open ports :
  - general/tcp (Security hole found)

 . Vulnerability found on port general/tcp :

  It was possible
  to make the remote server crash
  using the 'teardrop' attack.

  A cracker may use this attack to
  shut down this server, thus
  preventing your network from
  working properly.

  Solution : contact your operating
  system vendor for a patch.

  Risk factor : High
  CVE : CAN-1999-0015

The result of our Nessus scan reveals two security holes and 15 security warnings on a default Solaris 2.6 OE system.

Using Rootkits

To demonstrate the capabilities of a rootkit, we use one built for Solaris 2.6 OE. This rootkit is detailed in the Sun BluePrints_ OnLine article, The Solaris Fingerprint Database—A Security Tool for Solaris Software and Files. Additionally, this rootkit is documented by the HoneyNet project.

The rootkit has a variety of programs that fit into the following categories:

  • Network sniffers
  • Log file cleanup
  • Internet Relay Chat (IRC) proxy

Included in the rootkit is an installation script for automating the installation of rootkit programs, setting program permissions, and erasing evidence from the log files.

The installation of the rootkit is as follows:

ganassi# ./setup.sh
hax0r w1th gforce
Ok This thing is complete :-)
cp: cannot access l0gin
cp: cannot create /usr/local/bin/find: No such file or directory
mv: cannot access /etc/.ts
mv: cannot access /etc/.tp
- WTMP:
/var/adm/wtmp is Thu Mar 26 13:21:36 1987
/usr/adm/wtmp cannot open
/etc/wtmp is Thu Mar 26 13:21:36 1987
/var/log/wtmp cannot open
WTMP = /var/adm/wtmp
No user re found in /var/adm/wtmp
[...]
./setup.sh: ./zap: not found
./secure.sh: rpc.ttdb=: not found
#: securing.
#: 1) changing modes on local files.
#: will add more local security later.
#: 2) remote crap like rpc.status , nlockmgr etc..
./secure.sh: usage: kill [ [ -sig ] id ... | -l ]
./secure.sh: usage: kill [ [ -sig ] id ... | -l ]
#: 3) killed statd , rpcbind , nlockmgr
#: 4) removing them so they ever start again!
5) secured.
  193 ?    0:00 inetd
cp: cannot access /dev/.. /sun/bot2
kill these processes@!#!@#!
cp: cannot access lpq
./setup.sh: /dev/ttyt/idrun: cannot execute
Irc Proxy v2.6.4 GNU project (C) 1998-99
Coded by James Seter :bugs-> (Pharos@refract.com) or IRC pharos on efnet
--Using conf file ./sys222.conf
--Configuration:
  Daemon port......:9879
  Maxusers.........:0
  Default conn port:6667
  Pid File.........:./pid.sys222
  Vhost Default....:-SYSTEM DEFAULT-
  Process Id.......:759
Exit ./sys222{7} :Successfully went into the background.

The installation script is neither elegant nor correct for the Solaris 2.6 OE; however, it performs the job. It replaces the following system files:

/bin/ls
/usr/bin/ls
/bin/ps
/bin/netstat
/usr/bin/netstat
/usr/sbin/rpcbind

Now the attacker has root access to a system on which:

  • It is difficult for an administrator to detect the intruder through standard Solaris OE commands, such as ls, find, ps, and netstat, because those binaries are replaced by trojan (hidden inside something that appears safe) versions.

  • It is easy for the attacker to gain access repeatedly because the new and trojaned system binaries for the login and rpcbind allow the attacker to gain access and execute commands on the system remotely.

The rootkit installs network sniffers on the victim system. This rootkit installs four network sniffers: le, sniff, sniff-10mb, and sniff-100mb.

Only the sniff-100mb executable is usable on ganassi; the other sniffers are hard-coded for specific interfaces.

The sniff-100mb executable defaults to the hme0 interface on ganassi. When the executable is run on ganassi, it produces a nicely formatted summary of network activity on the system:

ganassi# ./sniff-100mb
Using logical device /dev/hme [/dev/hme]
Output to stdout.

Log started at => Thu Aug 26 15:31:10 [pid 856]


-- TCP/IP LOG -- TM: Thu Aug 26 15:31:19 --
 PATH: 10.8.10.200(34398) => ganassi(telnet)
 STAT: Thu Aug 26 15:31:48, 111 pkts, 128 bytes [DATA LIMIT]
 DATA: (255)(253)^C(255)(251)^X(255)(251)^_(255)(251)
(255)(251)!(255)(251)"(255)(251)'(255)(253)^E(255)(250)^_
   : P
   : ^X(255)(240)(255)(252)#(255)(252)$(255)(250)^X
   : DTTERM(255)(240)(255)(250)'
   : (255)(240)(255)(253)^A(255)(252)^Anoorder
   : t00lk1t
   : ls
   : who
   : cd /var/tmp
   : ls -al
--

This output includes the user ID and password used to access the system.

The rootkit includes log cleanup programs and an IRC proxy.

Several sets of logs are sanitized by the rootkit: utmp, utmpx, wtmp, wtmpx, and lastlog. The program that sanitizes the logs is called zap; it looks for and removes files in common directories.

The IRC proxy in the rootkit includes a bot. The proxy bounces IRC messages across a private IRC channel. The bot keeps the channel open and responds to certain commands.

Using Sniffers

To demonstrate the capabilities of a sniffer to extract a user ID and password from a Telnet and IMAP session, we use the snoop tool. Collecting the information for the samples only took a few seconds.

The following is an example of the insecurities of Telnet:

# snoop -d qfe0 port telnet ganassi
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835 \377\373\1\377\375\1login:
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 r
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835 r
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 o
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835 o
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 o
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835 o
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 t
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835 t
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835 Password:
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 t
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 0
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 0
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 l
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 k
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 1
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835 t
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835 Last login: Thu Mar
  nomex-lab -> ganassi   TELNET C port=32835
   ganassi -> nomex-lab  TELNET R port=32835 #

The following is an example of the insecurities of IMAP:

# snoop -d qfe0 port imap2 ganassi
jordan -> ganassi IMAP C port=46600
ganassi -> jordan IMAP R port=46600
jordan -> ganassi IMAP C port=46600
ganassi -> jordan IMAP R port=46600 * OK ganassi SIMS (tm) 2.0p12 IMAP
jordan -> ganassi IMAP C port=46600
jordan -> ganassi IMAP C port=46600 1 capability\r\n
ganassi -> jordan IMAP R port=46600
ganassi -> jordan IMAP R port=46600 * CAPABILITY IMAP4 STATUS SCAN IMAP4
jordan -> ganassi IMAP C port=46600
jordan -> ganassi IMAP C port=46600 2 login "hacked" "t00lk1t"\r\n
ganassi -> jordan IMAP R port=46600 2 OK LOGIN completed

Using the snoop tool is fairly straightforward. If it runs for very long, it collects a great deal of data, and it might be noticed. The ideal solution for an attacker is an automated tool that only saves the user ID and password information for a specific list of protocols. Several tools are available to perform this task: the relatively simple sniffit and the much more flexible and extensive dsniff. (The dsniff tool provides automated mechanisms for attacking switched networks.) Either of these tools can be left running on a system for weeks, or months, to collect hundreds, maybe thousands, of passwords.

Switched Networks

No evaluation of network sniffing is complete without covering network switches. Network switches connect multiple systems to the same network segment in much the same manner as a network hub. The major difference is in the switch's ability to forward packets on a per-port basis. In this manner, only network traffic destined for a port is forwarded to it, instead of the port seeing all network traffic. With this configuration, even if a network interface is in the promiscuous mode, it does not see the traffic destined for another port on the same system.

Many people, based on this configuration, believe that network sniffing is useless. This belief is not true for two reasons. First, a sniffer running on a system captures all non-encrypted user ID and password strings sent to and from the system to any other system on the network. Secondly, publicly disclosed address resolution protocol (ARP) attacks can be launched against the network switch itself. These attacks can force the switch to relay all packets through one port, on which the sniffer is running. Network switches are a layer of protection against sniffing, however, they are not a complete solution.

To protect against network sniffing, encrypt authentication information. For example, instead of using Telnet and FTP, use Secure Shell (SSH). Instead of using plain POP3 for email, encrypt the session over secured sockets layer (SSL) for privacy. These precautions protect against network sniffing.

Terminal Servers

Many organizations use terminal servers to manage and administer headless systems (systems without a local display, keyboard, or mouse, and are managed remotely via remote consoles). While effective in leveraging datacenter space and "lights-out" datacenter environments, recognize that terminal servers can have many of the same vulnerabilities as systems. For example, the terminal servers shipped with Sun_ Cluster 3.0 software are normally 8-port Bay Annex servers. These terminal servers are accessed through Telnet.

The following is a snoop trace of a root login into this terminal server:

# snoop -d qfe0 nts01
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 \nRotaries Defined:
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 \n\nEnter Annex p
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 3
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 Attached to port 3
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 ganassi console lo
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 r
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 r
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 o
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 o
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 o
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 o
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 t
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 t
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 Password:
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 t
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 0
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 0
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 l
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 k
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 1
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395 t
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 Mar 26 13:04:36 ga
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 Last login:
  nomex -> nts01 TELNET C port=34395
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 Thu Mar 26 13:03:06
 nts01 -> nomex  TELNET R port=34395 SunOS 5.6    Gene

Clearly, these terminal servers need to be protected by the same encryption technology as all the systems on the network. Two alternatives are available to secure terminal servers. The first is to purchase terminal servers that support encryption for privacy through a mechanism such as SSH. The second alternative is to provide a landing pad that functions as a gateway between the terminal servers and the rest of the network. This gateway supports SSH, and the private network on which the terminal services reside isolate the use of Telnet.

  • + Share This
  • 🔖 Save To Your Account

InformIT Promotional Mailings & Special Offers

I would like to receive exclusive offers and hear about products from InformIT and its family of brands. I can unsubscribe at any time.

Overview


Pearson Education, Inc., 221 River Street, Hoboken, New Jersey 07030, (Pearson) presents this site to provide information about products and services that can be purchased through this site.

This privacy notice provides an overview of our commitment to privacy and describes how we collect, protect, use and share personal information collected through this site. Please note that other Pearson websites and online products and services have their own separate privacy policies.

Collection and Use of Information


To conduct business and deliver products and services, Pearson collects and uses personal information in several ways in connection with this site, including:

Questions and Inquiries

For inquiries and questions, we collect the inquiry or question, together with name, contact details (email address, phone number and mailing address) and any other additional information voluntarily submitted to us through a Contact Us form or an email. We use this information to address the inquiry and respond to the question.

Online Store

For orders and purchases placed through our online store on this site, we collect order details, name, institution name and address (if applicable), email address, phone number, shipping and billing addresses, credit/debit card information, shipping options and any instructions. We use this information to complete transactions, fulfill orders, communicate with individuals placing orders or visiting the online store, and for related purposes.

Surveys

Pearson may offer opportunities to provide feedback or participate in surveys, including surveys evaluating Pearson products, services or sites. Participation is voluntary. Pearson collects information requested in the survey questions and uses the information to evaluate, support, maintain and improve products, services or sites, develop new products and services, conduct educational research and for other purposes specified in the survey.

Contests and Drawings

Occasionally, we may sponsor a contest or drawing. Participation is optional. Pearson collects name, contact information and other information specified on the entry form for the contest or drawing to conduct the contest or drawing. Pearson may collect additional personal information from the winners of a contest or drawing in order to award the prize and for tax reporting purposes, as required by law.

Newsletters

If you have elected to receive email newsletters or promotional mailings and special offers but want to unsubscribe, simply email information@informit.com.

Service Announcements

On rare occasions it is necessary to send out a strictly service related announcement. For instance, if our service is temporarily suspended for maintenance we might send users an email. Generally, users may not opt-out of these communications, though they can deactivate their account information. However, these communications are not promotional in nature.

Customer Service

We communicate with users on a regular basis to provide requested services and in regard to issues relating to their account we reply via email or phone in accordance with the users' wishes when a user submits their information through our Contact Us form.

Other Collection and Use of Information


Application and System Logs

Pearson automatically collects log data to help ensure the delivery, availability and security of this site. Log data may include technical information about how a user or visitor connected to this site, such as browser type, type of computer/device, operating system, internet service provider and IP address. We use this information for support purposes and to monitor the health of the site, identify problems, improve service, detect unauthorized access and fraudulent activity, prevent and respond to security incidents and appropriately scale computing resources.

Web Analytics

Pearson may use third party web trend analytical services, including Google Analytics, to collect visitor information, such as IP addresses, browser types, referring pages, pages visited and time spent on a particular site. While these analytical services collect and report information on an anonymous basis, they may use cookies to gather web trend information. The information gathered may enable Pearson (but not the third party web trend services) to link information with application and system log data. Pearson uses this information for system administration and to identify problems, improve service, detect unauthorized access and fraudulent activity, prevent and respond to security incidents, appropriately scale computing resources and otherwise support and deliver this site and its services.

Cookies and Related Technologies

This site uses cookies and similar technologies to personalize content, measure traffic patterns, control security, track use and access of information on this site, and provide interest-based messages and advertising. Users can manage and block the use of cookies through their browser. Disabling or blocking certain cookies may limit the functionality of this site.

Do Not Track

This site currently does not respond to Do Not Track signals.

Security


Pearson uses appropriate physical, administrative and technical security measures to protect personal information from unauthorized access, use and disclosure.

Children


This site is not directed to children under the age of 13.

Marketing


Pearson may send or direct marketing communications to users, provided that

  • Pearson will not use personal information collected or processed as a K-12 school service provider for the purpose of directed or targeted advertising.
  • Such marketing is consistent with applicable law and Pearson's legal obligations.
  • Pearson will not knowingly direct or send marketing communications to an individual who has expressed a preference not to receive marketing.
  • Where required by applicable law, express or implied consent to marketing exists and has not been withdrawn.

Pearson may provide personal information to a third party service provider on a restricted basis to provide marketing solely on behalf of Pearson or an affiliate or customer for whom Pearson is a service provider. Marketing preferences may be changed at any time.

Correcting/Updating Personal Information


If a user's personally identifiable information changes (such as your postal address or email address), we provide a way to correct or update that user's personal data provided to us. This can be done on the Account page. If a user no longer desires our service and desires to delete his or her account, please contact us at customer-service@informit.com and we will process the deletion of a user's account.

Choice/Opt-out


Users can always make an informed choice as to whether they should proceed with certain services offered by InformIT. If you choose to remove yourself from our mailing list(s) simply visit the following page and uncheck any communication you no longer want to receive: www.informit.com/u.aspx.

Sale of Personal Information


Pearson does not rent or sell personal information in exchange for any payment of money.

While Pearson does not sell personal information, as defined in Nevada law, Nevada residents may email a request for no sale of their personal information to NevadaDesignatedRequest@pearson.com.

Supplemental Privacy Statement for California Residents


California residents should read our Supplemental privacy statement for California residents in conjunction with this Privacy Notice. The Supplemental privacy statement for California residents explains Pearson's commitment to comply with California law and applies to personal information of California residents collected in connection with this site and the Services.

Sharing and Disclosure


Pearson may disclose personal information, as follows:

  • As required by law.
  • With the consent of the individual (or their parent, if the individual is a minor)
  • In response to a subpoena, court order or legal process, to the extent permitted or required by law
  • To protect the security and safety of individuals, data, assets and systems, consistent with applicable law
  • In connection the sale, joint venture or other transfer of some or all of its company or assets, subject to the provisions of this Privacy Notice
  • To investigate or address actual or suspected fraud or other illegal activities
  • To exercise its legal rights, including enforcement of the Terms of Use for this site or another contract
  • To affiliated Pearson companies and other companies and organizations who perform work for Pearson and are obligated to protect the privacy of personal information consistent with this Privacy Notice
  • To a school, organization, company or government agency, where Pearson collects or processes the personal information in a school setting or on behalf of such organization, company or government agency.

Links


This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that we are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read the privacy statements of each and every web site that collects Personal Information. This privacy statement applies solely to information collected by this web site.

Requests and Contact


Please contact us about this Privacy Notice or if you have any requests or questions relating to the privacy of your personal information.

Changes to this Privacy Notice


We may revise this Privacy Notice through an updated posting. We will identify the effective date of the revision in the posting. Often, updates are made to provide greater clarity or to comply with changes in regulatory requirements. If the updates involve material changes to the collection, protection, use or disclosure of Personal Information, Pearson will provide notice of the change through a conspicuous notice on this site or other appropriate way. Continued use of the site after the effective date of a posted revision evidences acceptance. Please contact us if you have questions or concerns about the Privacy Notice or any objection to any revisions.

Last Update: November 17, 2020