- Table of Contents
- Overview
- Web Application Security
- Operating System Security
- Network Security
- Hardening Your System
- Wireless Security
- Wireless Basics
- Frequency and Data
- Using the Spectrum
- Why is Wireless Security Important?
- Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
- MAC Filtering
- Radiation Zone
- Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
- Firewall
- Virtual Private Network (VPN)
- Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)
- Setting Up Windows 2003 for PEAP
- Setting Up Windows 2003 for PEAP, Part 2
- Setting Up Windows 2003 for PEAP, Part 3
- Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
- Intrusion-Detection System (IDS)
- Wireless Intrusion Detection Solutions
- Practical SOHO Public WLAN Setup
- ZoneCD: The Secure Way to Share Your Internet Connection
- ZoneCD, Part 2: Online Configuration Options
- ZoneCD, Part 3: Gateway Options
- Natural Wi-Fi Jamming
- Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
- WPA Part 2: Weak IV's
- WPA Part 3: WPA Fixes
- Securing Your Wireless PDA Connection
- Securing Your Wireless PDA Connection, Part 2
- Wireless Intrusion Detection Tools
- Wireless Intrusion Detection Tools, Part 2
- Wireless Intrusion Detection Tools, Part 3
- Handheld/PDA/Smartphone Wireless Sniffing
- Airpwn: Owning the Airwaves
- Wireless Denial of Service Attacks
- Wireless RF Audits
- Professional RF Analyzers
- Open Source Tools: ntop
- War-Driving Exposed
- Wireless Karma
- KisMAC
- Handheld War-driving
- WEPWedgie
- Byte-Sized Decryption of WEP with Chopchop, Part 1
- Byte-Sized Decryption of WEP with Chopchop, Part 2
- Fragmentation Attacks
- WEP Fragmentation Attack in Detail
- Windows Wireless Sniffers
- Penetration Testing with SILICA
- Owning the Auditors: WPA-PSK and USB Sticks
- Owning the Auditors: Cain and Abel
- The 10 Minute Wireless VPN: iPIG
- Informit Articles and Sample Chapters
- Mobile Security
- Data Forensics
- Legal and Ethical Issues of Security
- Home User Security
- Additional Resources
- Job Security for the IT Security Industry
- A Biased Book Review: Chained Exploits: Advanced Hacking Attacks from Start to Finish
- Security of Mechanical Locks
- Information Security in Academics
- Holiday Security: Hackers Don’t Take Holidays
- Gary McGraw on Building Secure Software
- Gary McGraw on Exploiting Online Games
- A Student-Hacker Showdown at the Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition
- The Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition Year 3: Revenge of the Red Cell
- Questions from RSA 2007
- How to Steal 80,000 Identities in One Day
MAC Filtering
Last updated Jan 1, 2004.
By default, every device on a wireless network has a unique address that's used to distinguish one wireless network interface card (WNIC) from another. This address is called the Media Access Control (MAC) address. In theory, since every WNIC has been pre-assigned a unique MAC address by the hardware vendor, an access point can be set up to only allow a pre-selected list of WNICs to connect. For example, the Linksys WAP11 includes a MAC filtering option in its software that allows an administrator to define who can connect to the WLAN by listing all the allowed MAC addresses. Once you have the MAC address of all the connecting WNICs, you can set up MAC filtering and enable it accordingly. This will stop many connection attempts made by unauthorized addresses.
However, while in theory this is an excellent way to stop hackers from accessing your WLAN, there's a serious flaw in MAC filtering: MAC addresses can be spoofed (faked) by changing WNIC settings. For example, the Dell TrueMobile includes software that allows a hacker to alter his MAC address to any address he chooses. Thus, this option is about as useful as trying to keep people from accessing a chat room by restricting chat handle names. To bypass such a restriction, a person only has to change his or her name.
Why would a software/hardware vendor want to allow a user to change a MAC address? Having the power to adjust a MAC address can provide a network administrator with more tools to keep control over the network. However, this increased power gives just as much control to an attacker. This is one example of how the ancient power struggle between user needs and security often plays right into an attacker's hands.
Regardless, if MAC filtering is an option, you should implement it on your WLAN. Just as with enabling WEP, MAC filtering does require a modicum of sniffing and network expertise. Thus, it can also serve as an intellectual barrier to most of the potential intruders of your wireless network. Note that if your WLAN supports more than 100 users, managing the MAC control list could be a time-consuming chore.


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