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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this book to my lovely wife, Jeannette, and my two beautiful children, Hannah and Derek, who have inspired and supported me throughout the development of this book.

I also dedicate this book to my father, Jose, and to the memory of my mother, Generosa. Without their knowledge, wisdom, and guidance, I would not have the goals that I strive to achieve today.

—Omar

The most important thing in life is family:

To my wife of 17 years: Kathy, without your support and encouragement, I would not be where I am today.

To my kids, Kaitlyn, Alex, and Grace: You give me the strength and motivation to do what I do.

To my parents: It was your example that instilled in me the drive and work ethic that has gotten me this far.

—Ron

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- Figure 5-19 Screenshot of Kali Linux © 2018 Kali Linux
- Figure 5-20 Screenshot of Kali Linux © 2018 Kali Linux
- Figure 5-23 Screenshot of Kali Linux © 2018 Kali Linux
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- Figure 6-14 Screenshot of DVWA © 2014-2017 Dewhurst Security

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Figure 9-12 Screenshot of Zenmap © Nmap
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Category: Vulnerability Scanning Tools by OWASP
Figure 9-14 Screenshot of Greenbone © 2017 Greenbone Networks
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OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Project by OWASP
Figure 9-18 Screenshot of OWASP ZAP © OWASP
Figure 9-19 Screenshot of OWASP ZAP © OWASP
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Figure 9-21 Screenshot of Kali Linux © 2018 Kali Linux
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Chapter Opener images: Charlie Edwards/Gettyimages

Introduction

CompTIA PenTest+ is a security penetration testing certification that focuses on performance-based and multiple-choice questions, as well as simulations that require a candidate to demonstrate the hands-on ability to complete a penetration testing engagement. PenTest+ candidates must demonstrate their skills in planning and scoping a penetration testing engagement. Candidates are also required to know how to mitigate security weaknesses and vulnerabilities, as well as how to exploit them.

CompTIA PenTest+ is an intermediate-level cybersecurity career certification. Historically, the only intermediate-level cybersecurity certification was the CompTIA Cybersecurity Analyst (CySA+). Today, PenTest+ provides an alternate path from those who want to specialize in security penetration testing (ethical hacking).

CompTIA PenTest+ and CySA+ can be taken in any order. Either exam typically follows the skills learned in Security+. The main difference between CySA+ and PenTest+ is that CySA+ focuses on defensive security (including incident detection and response), whereas PenTest+ focuses on offensive security (ethical hacking or penetration testing).

NOTE CompTIA PenTest+ is a globally recognized certification that demonstrates the holder's knowledge and skills across a broad range of security topics.

The Goals of the CompTIA PenTest+ Certification

The CompTIA PenTest+ certification was created and is managed by one of the most prestigious organizations in the world and has a number of stated goals. Although not critical for passing the exam, having knowledge of the organization and of these goals is helpful in understanding the motivation behind the creation of the exam.

Sponsoring Bodies

The Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA) is a vendor-neutral IT certification body that is recognized worldwide. CompTIA has been in existence for more than 20 years. It develops certificate programs for IT support, networking, security, Linux, cloud, and mobility. CompTIA is a nonprofit trade association.

PenTest+ is one of a number of security-related certifications offered by CompTIA. Other certifications offered by this organization include the following:

- CompTIA Security+
- CompTIA Cybersecurity Analyst (CySA+)
- CompTIA Advanced Security Practitioner (CASP)

CompTIA offers certifications in other focus areas, including the following:

- CompTIA IT Fundamentals
- CompTIA A+
- CompTIA Network+
- CompTIA Cloud Essentials
- CompTIA Cloud+
- CompTIA Linux+
- CompTIA Server+
- CompTIA Project+
- CompTIA CTT+

Stated Goals

The goal of CompTIA in its administration of the PenTest+ certification is to provide a reliable instrument to measure an individual's knowledge of cybersecurity penetration testing (ethical hacking). This knowledge is not limited to technical skills alone but extends to all aspects of a successful penetration testing engagement.

The Exam Objectives (Domains)

The CompTIA PenTest+ exam is broken down into five major domains. This book covers all the domains and the subtopics included in them. The following table lists the breakdown of the domains represented in the exam:

Domain	Percentage of Representation in Exam
1.0 Planning and Scoping	15%
2.0 Information Gathering and Vulnerability Identification	22%
3.0 Attacks and Exploits	30%
4.0 Penetration Testing Tools	17%
5.0 Reporting and Communication	16%
	Total 100%

1.0 Planning and Scoping

The Planning and Scoping domain, which is covered in Chapter 2, discusses the importance of good planning and scoping in a penetration testing or ethical hacking

engagement. Comprising 15% of the exam, it covers several key legal concepts and the different aspects of compliance-based assessment. It Covers topics including the following:

- Explain the importance of planning for an engagement.
- Explain key legal concepts.
- Explain the importance of scoping an engagement properly.
- Explain the key aspects of compliance-based assessments.

2.0 Information Gathering and Vulnerability Identification

The Information Gathering and Vulnerability Identification domain, which is covered in Chapter 3, starts out by discussing in general what reconnaissance is and the difference between passive and active reconnaissance methods. It touches on some of the common tools and techniques used. From there it covers the process of vulnerability scanning and how vulnerability scanning tools work, including how to analyze vulnerability scanning results to provide useful deliverables and the process of leveraging the gathered information in the exploitation phase. Finally, it discusses some of the common challenges to consider when performing vulnerability scans. This domain accounts for 22% of the exam. Topics include the following:

- Given a scenario, conduct information gathering using appropriate techniques.
- Given a scenario, perform a vulnerability scan.
- Given a scenario, analyze vulnerability scan results.
- Explain the process of leveraging information to prepare for exploitation.
- Explain weaknesses related to specialized systems.

3.0 Attacks and Exploits

The Attacks and Exploits domain is covered throughout Chapters 4 through 8. These chapters include topics such as social engineering attacks, exploitation of wired and wireless networks, application-based vulnerabilities, local host and physical security vulnerabilities, and post-exploitation techniques. It encompasses 30% of the exam. Topics include the following:

- Compare and contrast social engineering attacks.
- Given a scenario, exploit network-based vulnerabilities.
- Given a scenario, exploit wireless and RF-based vulnerabilities.
- Given a scenario, exploit application-based vulnerabilities.

- Given a scenario, exploit local host vulnerabilities.
- Summarize physical security attacks related to facilities.
- Given a scenario, perform post-exploitation techniques.

4.0 Penetration Testing Tools

The Penetration Testing Tools domain is covered in Chapter 9. In this chapter, you will learn different use cases for penetration testing tools. You will also learn how to analyze the output of some of the most popular penetration testing tools to make informed assessments. At the end of the chapter, you will learn how to leverage the bash shell, Python, Ruby, and PowerShell to perform basic scripting. This domain accounts for 17% of the exam. The topics include the following:

- Given a scenario, use Nmap to conduct information gathering exercises.
- Compare and contrast various use cases of tools.
- Given a scenario, analyze tool output or data related to a penetration test.
- Given a scenario, analyze a basic script (limited to bash, Python, Ruby, and PowerShell).

5.0 Reporting and Communication

The Reporting and Communication domain is covered in Chapter 10, which starts out by discussing post-engagement activities, such as cleanup of any tools or shells left on systems that were part of the test. From there it covers report writing best practices, including the common report elements as well as findings and recommendations. Finally, it touches on report handling and proper communication best practices. This domain makes up 16% of the exam. Topics include the following:

- Given a scenario, use report writing and handling best practices.
- Explain post-report delivery activities.
- Given a scenario, recommend mitigation strategies for discovered vulnerabilities.
- Explain the importance of communication during the penetration testing process.

Steps to Earning the PenTest+ Certification

To earn the PenTest+ certification, a test candidate must meet certain prerequisites and follow specific procedures. Test candidates must qualify for and sign up for the exam.

Recommended Experience

There are no prerequisites for the PenTest+ certification. However, CompTIA recommends that candidates possess Network+, Security+, or equivalent knowledge.

NOTE Certifications such as Cisco CCNA CyberOps can help candidates and can be used as an alternative to Security+.

CompTIA also recommends a minimum of three to four years of hands-on information security or related experience.

Signing Up for the Exam

The steps required to sign up for the PenTest+ exam are as follows:

1. Create a Pearson Vue account at pearsonvue.com and schedule your exam.
2. Complete the examination agreement, attesting to the truth of your assertions regarding professional experience and legally committing to the adherence to the testing policies.
3. Review the candidate background questions.
4. Submit the examination fee.

The following website presents the CompTIA certification exam policies:
<https://certification.comptia.org/testing/test-policies>.

Facts About the PenTest+ Exam

The PenTest+ exam is a computer-based test that focuses on performance-based and multiple-choice questions. There are no formal breaks, but you are allowed to bring a snack and eat it at the back of the test room; however, any time used for breaks counts toward 165 minutes allowed for the test. You must bring a government-issued identification card. No other forms of ID will be accepted. You may be required to submit to a palm vein scan.

About the CompTIA® PenTest+ Cert Guide

This book maps to the topic areas of the CompTIA® PenTest+ exam and uses a number of features to help you understand the topics and prepare for the exam.

Objectives and Methods

This book uses several key methodologies to help you discover the exam topics on which you need more review, to help you fully understand and remember those details, and to help you prove to yourself that you have retained your knowledge of those topics. This book does not try to help you pass the exam only by memorization; it seeks to help you truly learn and understand the topics. This book is designed to help you pass the PenTest+ exam by using the following methods:

- Helping you discover which exam topics you have not mastered
- Providing explanations and information to fill in your knowledge gaps
- Supplying exercises that enhance your ability to recall and deduce the answers to test questions
- Providing practice exercises on the topics and the testing process via test questions on the companion website

Customizing Your Exams

In the exam settings screen, you can choose to take exams in one of three modes:

- **Study mode:** Allows you to fully customize your exams and review answers as you are taking the exam. This is typically the mode you would use first to assess your knowledge and identify information gaps.
- **Practice Exam mode:** Locks certain customization options, as it is presenting a realistic exam experience. Use this mode when you are preparing to test your exam readiness.
- **Flash Card mode:** Strips out the answers and presents you with only the question stem. This mode is great for late-stage preparation, when you really want to challenge yourself to provide answers without the benefit of seeing multiple-choice options. This mode does not provide the detailed score reports that the other two modes do, so it will not be as helpful as the other modes at helping you identify knowledge gaps.

In addition to choosing among these three modes, you will be able to select the source of your questions. You can choose to take exams that cover all the chapters, or you can narrow your selection to just a single chapter or the chapters that make up specific parts in the book. All chapters are selected by default. If you want to narrow your focus to individual chapters, simply deselect all the chapters and then select only those on which you wish to focus in the Objectives area.

You can also select the exam banks on which to focus. Each exam bank comes complete with a full exam of questions that cover topics in every chapter. The two exams printed in the book are available to you, as are two additional exams of unique questions. You can have the test engine serve up exams from all four banks or just from one individual bank by selecting the desired banks in the exam bank area.

There are several other customizations you can make to your exam from the exam settings screen, such as the time of the exam, the number of questions served up, whether to randomize questions and answers, whether to show the number of correct answers for multiple-answer questions, and whether to serve up only specific types of questions. You can also create custom test banks by selecting only questions that you have marked or questions on which you have added notes.

Updating Your Exams

If you are using the online version of the Pearson Test Prep software, you should always have access to the latest version of the software as well as the exam data. If you are using the Windows desktop version, every time you launch the software while connected to the Internet, it checks whether there are any updates to your exam data and automatically downloads any changes made since the last time you used the software.

Sometimes, due to many factors, the exam data may not fully download when you activate your exam. If you find that figures or exhibits are missing, you may need to manually update your exams. To update a particular exam you have already activated and downloaded, simply click the **Tools** tab and click the **Update Products** button. Again, this is only an issue with the desktop Windows application.

If you wish to check for updates to the Pearson Test Prep exam engine software, Windows desktop version, simply click the **Tools** tab and click the **Update Application** button. By doing so, you ensure that you are running the latest version of the software engine.

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Exploiting Local Host and Physical Security Vulnerabilities

In this chapter you will learn about exploiting local host vulnerabilities, as well as physical security flaws. This chapter provides details on how to take advantage of insecure services and protocol configurations during a penetration testing engagement. You will also learn how to perform local privilege escalation attacks as part of penetration testing. This chapter provides details to help you gain an understanding of Set-UID, Set-GID, and Unix programs, as well as ret2libc attacks. This chapter also covers privilege escalation attacks against Windows systems and the security flaws of Android and Apple iOS mobile devices. In this chapter you will also gain an understanding of physical security attacks such as piggybacking, tailgating, fence jumping, dumpster diving, lock picking, and badge cloning.

“Do I Know This Already?” Quiz

The “Do I Know This Already?” quiz allows you to assess whether you should read this entire chapter thoroughly or jump to the “Exam Preparation Tasks” section. If you are in doubt about your answers to these questions or your own assessment of your knowledge of the topics, read the entire chapter. Table 7-1 lists the major headings in this chapter and their corresponding “Do I Know This Already?” quiz questions. You can find the answers in Appendix A, “Answers to the ‘Do I Know This Already?’ Quizzes and Q&A Sections.”

Table 7-1 “Do I Know This Already?” Section-to-Question Mapping

Foundation Topics Section	Questions
Exploiting Local Host Vulnerabilities	1–8
Understanding Physical Security Attacks	9–10

CAUTION The goal of self-assessment is to gauge your mastery of the topics in this chapter. If you do not know the answer to a question or are only partially sure of the answer, you should mark that question as incorrect for purposes of the self-assessment. Giving yourself credit for an answer you correctly guess skews your self-assessment results and might provide you with a false sense of security.

1. Which of the following is not an insecure service or protocol?
 - a. Cisco Smart Install
 - b. Telnet
 - c. Finger
 - d. Windows PowerSploit
2. Consider the following example:

```
omar@ares:~$ ls -l topsecret.txt
-rwxrwxr-- 1 omar omar 15 May 26 21:15 topsecret.txt
```

What permissions does the user omar have in the topsecret.txt file?
 - a. Read only
 - b. Write only
 - c. Read, write, execute
 - d. Write, execute
3. Which of the following is not true about sticky bits?
 - a. A restricted deletion flag, or sticky bit, is a single bit whose interpretation depends on the file type.
 - b. For directories, the sticky bit prevents unprivileged users from removing or renaming a file in the directory unless they own the file or the directory; this is called the restricted deletion flag for the directory, and is commonly found on world-writable directories such as /tmp.
 - c. If the sticky bit is set on a directory, files inside the directory cannot be renamed or removed by the owner of the file, the owner of the directory, or the superuser (even though the modes of the directory might allow such an operation).
 - d. For regular files on some older systems, the sticky bit saves the program's text image on the swap device so it will load more quickly when run.

4. Which of the following is a type of attack in which a subroutine return address on a call stack is replaced by an address of a subroutine that is already present in the executable memory of the process?
 - a. Ret2libc
 - b. ASLR bypass
 - c. CPassword
 - d. Sticky-bit attack
5. Which of the following is a component of Active Directory's Group Policy Preferences that allows administrators to set passwords via Group Policy?
 - a. Ret2libc
 - b. CPassword
 - c. Sticky-bit
 - d. GPO crack
6. Which of the following tools allows an attacker to dump the LSASS process from memory to disk?
 - a. John the Ripper
 - b. SAMsploit
 - c. Sysinternals ProcDump
 - d. Windows PowerShell
7. The SELinux and AppArmor security frameworks include enforcement rules that attempt to prevent which of the following attacks?
 - a. Lateral movement
 - b. Sandbox escape
 - c. Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
 - d. Cross-site scripting (XSS)

- 8.** Which of the following is not one of the top mobile security threats and vulnerabilities?
 - a.** Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
 - b.** Insecure data storage
 - c.** Insecure communication
 - d.** Insecure authentication
- 9.** Which of the following is an attack in which the attacker tries to retrieve encryption keys from a running operating system after using a system reload?
 - a.** Hot-boot
 - b.** Rowhammer
 - c.** Cold boot
 - d.** ASLR bypass
- 10.** Which of the following is the term for an unauthorized individual following an authorized individual to enter a restricted building or facility?
 - a.** Lockpicking
 - b.** Dumpster diving
 - c.** Badge cloning
 - d.** Tailgating

Foundation Topics

Exploiting Local Host Vulnerabilities

Threat actors take advantage of numerous local host vulnerabilities to carry out different attacks. In this section, you will learn about exploits against local host vulnerabilities such as taking advantage of specific operating system flaws, escalating local privileges, stealing credentials, installing key loggers, and abusing physical device security. You will also learn about different virtual machine and container vulnerabilities, and you will learn about cold boot attacks, JTAG debugging, and different attacks that can be carried out over the serial console of a device.

Insecure Service and Protocol Configurations

Key Topic

Many attacks materialize because unused or insecure protocols, services, and associated ports, which are low-hanging fruit opportunities for attackers. In addition, many organizations don't patch vulnerabilities for the services, protocols, and ports they don't use—despite the fact that vulnerabilities may still be present for months or even years.

TIP A best practice is to clearly define and document the services, protocols, and ports that are necessary for business. An organization should ensure that all other services, protocols, and ports are disabled or removed. As a penetration tester, you should always go after insecure protocols, services, and associated ports.

Some protocols should never be used, such as Telnet and Cisco Smart Install. Telnet is a clear-text protocol that exposes the entire contents of any session to anyone who can gain access to the traffic. Secure Shell (SSH) should be used instead. If a switch is running the Cisco Smart Install protocol, any unauthenticated attacker can modify the configuration and fully compromise the switch.

NOTE You can obtain more information about Smart Install and related features from the following Cisco security advisory: <https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180409-smi>.

Other protocols, like Telnet, transfer sensitive data in clear text. Examples of these clear-text protocols include SNMP (versions 1 and 2), HTTP, syslog, IMAP, POP3, and FTP.

TIP In some cases, there is no secure alternative to otherwise insecure management protocols. In such a case, it is very important to understand what is at risk and what mitigation techniques could be implemented.

All insecure protocols are subject to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks or to IP traffic capture (sniffing). Example 7-1 shows how easy it is to capture a password from an FTP transaction by just sniffing the traffic using the Linux Tcpdump tool.

Example 7-1 Capturing Passwords and Sniffing Traffic from Clear-Text Protocols by Using Tcpdump

```
root@kubel:~# tcpdump -nnXSs 0 host 10.1.1.12
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode
listening on ens160, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144
bytes

22:50:23.958387 IP 10.1.1.12.50788 > 10.1.1.11.21: Flags [S], seq
314242458, win 29200, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 1523378506 ecr
0,nop,wscale 7], length 0
    0x0000: 4500 003c 1cd0 4000 4006 07d4 0a01 010c E..<..@.0.....
    0x0010: 0a01 010b c664 0015 12ba f59a 0000 0000 .....d.....
    0x0020: a002 7210 acf1 0000 0204 05b4 0402 080a ..r.....
    0x0030: 5acc e94a 0000 0000 0103 0307         Z..J.....
22:50:23.958455 IP 10.1.1.11.21 > 10.1.1.12.50788: Flags [S.], seq
4230935771, ack 314242459, win 28960, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val
1523511322 ecr 1523378506,nop,wscale 7], length 0
    0x0000: 4500 003c 0000 4000 4006 24a4 0a01 010b E..<..@.0.$....
    0x0010: 0a01 010c 0015 c664 fc2e f4db 12ba f59b .....d.....
    0x0020: a012 7120 1647 0000 0204 05b4 0402 080a ..q..G.....
    0x0030: 5ace f01a 5acc e94a 0103 0307         Z...Z..J....
22:50:23.958524 IP 10.1.1.12.50788 > 10.1.1.11.21: Flags [., ack
4230935772, win 229, options [nop,nop,TS val 1523378506 ecr 1523511322],
length 0
    0x0000: 4500 0034 1cd1 4000 4006 07db 0a01 010c E..4..@.0.....
    0x0010: 0a01 010b c664 0015 12ba f59b fc2e f4dc .....d.....
    0x0020: 8010 00e5 10e4 0000 0101 080a 5acc e94a .....Z..J
    0x0030: 5ace f01a                           Z...
22:50:23.961422 IP 10.1.1.11.21 > 10.1.1.12.50788: Flags [P.], seq
4230935772:4230935792, ack 314242459, win 227, options [nop,nop,TS val
1523511323 ecr 1523378506], length 20: FTP: 220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3)
    0x0000: 4500 0048 04c6 4000 4006 1fd2 0a01 010b E..H..@.0.....
    0x0010: 0a01 010c 0015 c664 fc2e f4dc 12ba f59b .....d.....
    0x0020: 8018 00e3 1653 0000 0101 080a 5ace f01b .....S.....Z...
    0x0030: 5acc e94a 3232 3020 2876 7346 5450 6420 Z..J220.(vsFTPD.
    0x0040: 332e 302e 3329 0d0a                   3.0.3)...
```

```
22:50:23.961485 IP 10.1.1.12.50788 > 10.1.1.11.21: Flags [.], ack  
4230935792, win 229, options [nop,nop,TS val 1523378507 ecr 1523511323],  
length 0  
0x0000: 4510 0034 1cd2 4000 4006 07ca 0a01 010c E..4..@.0.....  
0x0010: 0a01 010b c664 0015 12ba f59b fc2e f4f0 .....d.....  
0x0020: 8010 00e5 10ce 0000 0101 080a 5acc e94b .....Z..K  
0x0030: 5ace f01b Z...  
22:50:26.027005 IP 10.1.1.12.50788 > 10.1.1.11.21: Flags [P.], seq  
314242459:314242470, ack 4230935792, win 229, options [nop,nop,TS val  
1523379024 ecr 1523511323], length 11: FTP: USER omar  
0x0000: 4510 003f 1cd3 4000 4006 07be 0a01 010c E..?..@.0.....  
0x0010: 0a01 010b c664 0015 12ba f59b fc2e f4f0 .....d.....  
0x0020: 8018 00e5 6a32 0000 0101 080a 5acc eb50 ....j2.....Z..P  
0x0030: 5ace f01b 5553 4552 206f 6d61 720d 0a Z...USER.omar..  
22:50:26.027045 IP 10.1.1.11.21 > 10.1.1.12.50788: Flags [.], ack  
314242470, win 227, options [nop,nop,TS val 1523511839 ecr 1523379024],  
length 0  
0x0000: 4500 0034 04c7 4000 4006 1fe5 0a01 010b E..4..@.0.....  
0x0010: 0a01 010c 0015 c664 fc2e f4f0 12ba f5a6 .....d.....  
0x0020: 8010 00e3 163f 0000 0101 080a 5ace f21f .....?.....Z...  
0x0030: 5acc eb50 Z..P  
22:50:26.027343 IP 10.1.1.11.21 > 10.1.1.12.50788: Flags [P.], seq  
4230935792:4230935826, ack 314242470, win 227, options [nop,nop,TS val  
1523511839 ecr 1523379024], length 34: FTP: 331 Please specify the  
password.  
0x0000: 4500 0056 04c8 4000 4006 1fc2 0a01 010b E..V..@.0.....  
0x0010: 0a01 010c 0015 c664 fc2e f4f0 12ba f5a6 .....d.....  
0x0020: 8018 00e3 1661 0000 0101 080a 5ace f21f .....a.....Z...  
0x0030: 5acc eb50 3333 3120 506c 6561 7365 2073 Z..P331.Please.s  
0x0040: 7065 6369 6679 2074 6865 2070 6173 7377 pecify.the.  
0x0050: 6f72 642e 0d0a password...  
22:50:26.027393 IP 10.1.1.12.50788 > 10.1.1.11.21: Flags [.], ack  
4230935826, win 229, options [nop,nop,TS val 1523379024 ecr 1523511839],  
length 0  
0x0000: 4510 0034 1cd4 4000 4006 07c8 0a01 010c E..4..@.0.....  
0x0010: 0a01 010b c664 0015 12ba f5a6 fc2e f512 .....d.....  
0x0020: 8010 00e5 0c98 0000 0101 080a 5acc eb50 .....Z..P  
0x0030: 5ace f21f Z...  
22:50:30.053380 IP 10.1.1.12.50788 > 10.1.1.11.21: Flags [P.], seq  
314242470:314242485, ack 4230935826, win 229, options [nop,nop,TS val  
1523380030 ecr 1523511839], length 15: FTP: PASS badpass1  
0x0000: 4510 0043 1cd5 4000 4006 07b8 0a01 010c E..C..@.0.....  
0x0010: 0a01 010b c664 0015 12ba f5a6 fc2e f512 .....d.....  
0x0020: 8018 00e5 c455 0000 0101 080a 5acc ef3e .....U.....Z..>  
0x0030: 5ace f21f 5041 5353 2062 6164 7061 7373 Z...PASS.badpass  
0x0040: 310d 0a 1..
```

```

22:50:30.085058 IP 10.1.1.11.21 > 10.1.1.12.50788: Flags [P.], seq
4230935826:4230935849, ack 314242485, win 227, options [nop,nop,TS val
1523512854 ecr 1523380030], length 23: FTP: 230 Login successful.

0x0000: 4500 004b 04c9 4000 4006 1fcc 0a01 010b E..K..@.0..... .
0x0010: 0a01 010c 0015 c664 fc2e f512 12ba f5b5 .....d.......
0x0020: 8018 00e3 1656 0000 0101 080a 5ace f616 .....V.....Z...
0x0030: 5acc ef3e 3233 3020 4c6f 6769 6e20 7375 z..>230.Login.
0x0040: 6363 6573 7366 756c 2e0d 0a                     successful...

```

In Example 7-1 a host at IP address 10.1.1.12 initiates an FTP connection to an FTP server with IP address 10.1.1.11. In the packet capture, you can see the initial login transaction where the user (omar) successfully logs in using the password (bad-pass1), as demonstrated in the highlighted lines in Example 7-1. It is possible to use similar utilities, such as Tshark, to capture data from a live network (see <https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html>).

The following are also some of the services that are considered insecure:

- **Rlogin:** <https://linux.die.net/man/1/rlogin>
- **Rsh:** <https://linux.die.net/man/1/rsh>
- **Finger:** <https://linux.die.net/man/1/finger>

The following services should be carefully implemented and not exposed to untrusted networks:

- **Authd (or Identd):** <https://linux.die.net/man/3/ident>
- **Netdump:** <https://linux.die.net/man/8/netdump>
- **Netdump-server:** <https://linux.die.net/man/8/netdump-server>
- **Nfs:** <https://linux.die.net/man/5/nfs>
- **Rwhod:** <https://linux.die.net/man/8/rwhod>
- **Sendmail:** <https://linux.die.net/man/8/sendmail.sendmail>
- **Samba:** <https://linux.die.net/man/7/samba>
- **Yppasswdd:** <https://linux.die.net/man/8/yppasswdd>
- **Ypserv:** <https://linux.die.net/man/8/ypserv>
- **Ypxfrd:** <https://linux.die.net/man/8/ypxfrd>

TIP RedHat provides a great resource that goes over Linux server security; see https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/4/html/Security_Guide/ch-server.html.

Key Topic

Local Privilege Escalation

Privilege escalation is the process of elevating the level of authority (privileges) of a compromised user or a compromised application. This is done to further perform actions on the affected system or any other systems in the network, typically post-exploitation (that is, after gaining a foothold in the target system and exploiting a vulnerability).

NOTE In Chapter 8, “Performing Post-Exploitation Techniques,” you will learn about additional post-exploitation methodologies and tactics.

The main focus of the post-exploitation phase is to maintain access to the compromised systems and move around in the network while remaining undetected. In many cases, privilege escalation is required to perform those tasks.

It is possible to perform privilege escalation in a few different ways. An attacker may be able to compromise a system by logging in with a non-privileged account. Subsequently, the attacker can go from that unprivileged (or less privileged) account to another account that has greater authority, as shown in Figure 7-1.




FIGURE 7-1 Privilege Escalation from One Account to Another

It is also possible to perform privilege escalation by “upgrading,” or elevating, the privileges of the same account, as shown in Figure 7-2.



The same account is used, but the attacker manipulates the system to increase the account privilege.

FIGURE 7-2 Privilege Escalation Using the Same Account

In Figure 7-2, the user (omar) belongs to the engineering group (eng) and does not have administrative rights on the system. The attacker then exploits a vulnerability and is able to manipulate the system to put the same user (omar) in the admin group, subsequently giving the user administrative rights on the system.

Understanding Linux Permissions

This book assumes that you have familiarity with Linux and user accounts. As a refresher, in some cases users must be able to accomplish tasks that require privileges (for example, when installing a program or adding another user). This is why **sudo** exists. Example 7-2 shows the first few lines and description of the **sudo** man page.

Example 7-2 The Linux **sudo** Command

```
sudo, sudoedit – execute a command as another user

SYNOPSIS
    sudo -h | -K | -k | -V
    sudo -v [-AknS] [-a type] [-g group] [-h host] [-p prompt] [-u user]
    sudo -l [-AknS] [-a type] [-g group] [-h host] [-p prompt] [-U user]
    [-u user] [command]
    sudo [-AbEHnPS] [-a type] [-C num] [-c class] [-g group] [-h host]
    [-p prompt] [-r role] [-t type] [-u user] [VAR=value] [-i | -s] [command]
    sudoedit [-AknS] [-a type] [-C num] [-c class] [-g group] [-h host]
    [-p prompt] [-u user] file ...

DESCRIPTION
    sudo allows a permitted user to execute a command as the superuser
    or another user, as specified by the security policy. The invoking user's
    real (not effective) user ID is used to determine the user name with which
    to query the security policy.

    sudo supports a plugin architecture for security policies and input/
    output logging. Third parties can develop and distribute their own policy
    and I/O logging plug-ins to work seamlessly with the sudo front end. The
    default security policy is sudoers, which is configured via the file /etc/
    sudoers, or via LDAP. See the Plugins section for more information.

    The security policy determines what privileges, if any, a user has
    to run sudo. The policy may require that users authenticate themselves
    with a password or another authentication mechanism. If authentication
    is required, sudo will exit if the user's password is not entered within
    a configurable time limit. This limit is policy-specific; the default
    password prompt timeout for the sudoers security policy is unlimited.

    Security policies may support credential caching to allow the user
    to run sudo again for a period of time without requiring authentication.
    The sudoers policy caches credentials for 15 minutes, unless overridden
    in sudoers(5). By running sudo with the -v option, a user can update the
    cached credentials without running a command.
```

When invoked as sudoedit, the -e option (described below), is implied.

Security policies may log successful and failed attempts to use sudo. If an I/O plugin is configured, the running command's input and output may be logged as well.

. . . <output omitted for brevity>. . .

On Unix-based systems, you can use the **chmod** command to set permissions values on files and directories.

NOTE You can set permissions of a file or directory (folder) to a given user, a group of users, and others.

Key Topic

With Linux you can set three basic permissions:

- Read (r)
- Write (w)
- Execute (x)

You can apply these permissions to any type of files or to directories. Example 7-3 shows the permissions of a file called omar_file.txt. The user executes the **ls -l** command, and in the portion of the output on the left, you see **-rw-rw-r--**, which indicates that the current user (omar) has read and write permissions.

Example 7-3 Linux File Permissions

```
omar@dionysus:~$ ls -l omar_file.txt
-rw-rw-r-- 1 omar omar 15 May 26 23:45 omar_file.txt
```

Figure 7-3 explains the Linux file permissions.




FIGURE 7-3 Explaining Linux File Permissions

Example 7-4 shows how a user belonging to any group can change the permissions of the file to be read, write, executable by using the **chmod 0777** command.

Key Topic
Example 7-4 Changing File Permissions

```
omar@dionysus:~$ chmod 0777 omar_file.txt
omar@dionysus:~$ ls -l omar_file.txt
-rwxrwxrwx 1 omar omar 15 May 26 23:45 omar_file.txt
omar@dionysus:~$
```

As documented in the **chmod** man pages, the restricted deletion flag, or sticky bit, is a single bit whose interpretation depends on the file type. For directories, the sticky bit prevents unprivileged users from removing or renaming a file in the directory unless they own the file or the directory; this is called the restricted deletion flag for the directory, and it is commonly found on world-writable directories such as /tmp. For regular files on some older systems, the sticky bit saves the program's text image on the swap device so it will load more quickly when run.

TIP The sticky bit is obsolete with files, but it is used for directories to indicate that files can be unlinked or renamed only by their owner or the superuser. Sticky bits were used with files in very old Unix machines due to memory restrictions. If the sticky bit is set on a directory, files inside the directory may be renamed or removed only by the owner of the file, the owner of the directory, or the superuser (even though the modes of the directory might allow such an operation); on some systems, any user who can write to a file can also delete it. This feature was added to keep an ordinary user from deleting another's files from the /tmp directory.

There are two ways that you can use the **chmod** command:

- Symbolic (text) method
- Numeric method

When you use the symbolic method, the structure includes who has access and the permission given. The indication of who has access to the file is as follows:

- **u:** The user that owns the file
- **g:** The group that the file belongs to
- **o:** The other users (that is, everyone else)
- **a:** All of the above (that is, use **a** instead of **ugo**)

Example 7-5 shows how to remove the execute permissions for all users by using the **chmod a-x omar_file.txt** command.

Example 7-5 Symbolic Method Example

```
omar@dionysus:~$ ls -l omar_file.txt
-rwxrwxrwx 1 omar omar 15 May 26 23:45 omar_file.txt
omar@dionysus:~$ chmod a-x omar_file.txt
omar@dionysus:~$ ls -l omar_file.txt
-rw-rw-rw- 1 omar omar 15 May 26 23:45 omar_file.txt
omar@dionysus:~$
```

The **chmod** command allows you to use + to add permissions and - to remove permissions. The **chmod** command clears the set-group-ID (SGID or setgid) bit of a regular file if the file's group ID does not match the user's effective group ID or one of the user's supplementary group IDs, unless the user has appropriate privileges. Additional restrictions may cause the set-user-ID (SUID or setuid) and set-group-ID bits of MODE or FILE to be ignored. This behavior depends on the policy and functionality of the underlying **chmod** system call. When in doubt, check the underlying system behavior. This is clearly explained in the man page of the **chmod** command (**man chmod**). In addition, the **chmod** command retains a directory's SUID and SGID bits unless you explicitly indicate otherwise.

You can also use numbers to edit the permissions of a file or directory (for the owner, group, and others), as well as the SUID, SGID, and sticky bits. Example 7-4 shows the numeric method. The three-digit number specifies the permission, where each digit can be anything from 0 to 7. The first digit applies to permissions for the owner, the second digit applies to permissions for the group, and the third digit applies to permissions for all others.

Figure 7-4 demonstrates how the numeric method works.




FIGURE 7-4 Explaining the Linux File Permission Numeric Method

As shown in Figure 7-4, a binary number 1 is put under each permission granted and a 0 under each permission not granted. On the right in Figure 7-4, the binary-to-decimal conversion is done. This is why in Example 7-4, the numbers 777 make the file omar_file.txt world-writable (which means any user has read, write, and execute permissions).

A great online tool that you can use to practice setting the different parameters of Linux permissions is the Permissions Calculator, at <http://permissions-calculator.org> (see Figure 7-5).




FIGURE 7-5 Permissions Calculator Online Tool

The Permissions Calculator website also provides several examples using PHP, Python, and Ruby to change file and directory permissions programmatically, as shown in Figure 7-6.

The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "Unix Permissions and Lookup" with the URL "permissions-calculator.org/examples/". The page has tabs for Octal, Decode Octal, Symbolic, Info, and Code Examples, with "Code Examples" selected. The main content area is titled "Code Examples" and contains a note: "Here's a few simple code examples for changing file and directory permissions programmatically." Below this, there are two sections: "Chmod with PHP" and "Chmod with Python".

Chmod with PHP

Format:

```
bool chmod(string $path, int $mode);
```

Note: in PHP that the mode must be supplied as octal so always prefix with 0. For more info see <http://php.net/manual/en/function.chmod.php>.

```
<?php
chmod("/somedir/somefile", 755); // decimal; probably incorrect
chmod("/somedir/somefile", "u+rwx,g+rx"); // string; incorrect
chmod("/somedir/somefile", 0755); // octal; correct value of mode
?>
```

```
<?php
// SGID bit set, Everything for user, and group and read and exec
// for other
chmod("/somedir/somefile", 02775);
?>
```

Chmod with Python

Format:

```
os.chmod(path, mode)
```

In python it's possible to use octal values or use values defined in the stat module. For more info see <http://docs.python.org/library/os.html#os.chmod>.

```
import os

# Everything for user and group and read and exec for other
os.chmod("/somedir/somefile", 0775)

# SGID bit set, Everything for user and group and read and exec for other
```

FIGURE 7-6 Changing Permissions Programmatically

Understanding SUID or SGID and Unix Programs

A program or a script in which the owner is root (by setting its Set-UID bit) will execute with superuser (root) privileges. This introduces a security problem: If the system is compromised and that program is manipulated (as in the case of monolithic embedded devices), an attacker may be able to run additional executions as superuser (root).

Key Topic

Modern Unix and Linux-based systems ignore the SUID and SGID bits on shell scripts for this reason.

TIP An example of a SUID-based attack is the vulnerability that existed in the program /usr/lib/preserve (or /usr/lib/ex3.5preserve). This program, which is used by the vi and ex editors, automatically made a backup of the file being edited if the user was unexpectedly disconnected from the system before writing out changes to the file. The system wrote the changes to a temporary file in a special directory. The system also sent an email to the user using /bin/mail with a notification that the file had been saved. Because users could have been editing a file that was private or confidential, the directory used by the older version of the Preserve program was not accessible by most users on the system. Consequently, to let the Preserve program write into this directory and let the recovery program read from it, these programs were made SUID root.

You can find all the SUID and SGID files on your system by using the command shown in Example 7-6.

Example 7-6 Finding All the SUID and SGID Files on a System

```
omar@dionysus:~$ sudo find / \( -perm -004000 -o -perm -002000 \)
-type f -print
[sudo] password for omar: ****
find: '/proc/3491/task/3491/fdinfo/6':/usr/sbin/postqueue
/usr/sbin/postdrop
/usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/utempter/utempter
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/lxc-user-nic
/usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/bin/dotlock.mailutils
/usr/bin/pkexec
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/screen
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/crontab
/usr/bin/at
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/ssh-agent
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/expiry
```

```
/usr/bin/wall
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/bin/bsd-write
/usr/bin/mlocate
/usr/bin/newgidmap
/usr/bin/chage
/usr/bin/newuidmap
find: '/proc/3491/fdinfo/5': No such file or directory
/sbin/mount.cifs
/sbin/unix_chpwd
/sbin/pam_extrousers_chpwd
/sbin/mount.ecryptfs_private
/bin/fusermount
/bin/ping6
/bin/mount
/bin/umount
/bin/ntfs-3g
/bin/su
/bin/ping
```

In Example 7-6, the **find** command starts in the root directory (/) and looks for all files that match mode 002000 (SGID) or mode 004000 (SUID). The **-type f** option limits the search to files only.

TIP Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is a collection of kernel modifications and user-space tools that are now part of several Linux distributions. It supports access control security policies, including mandatory access controls. SELinux aims to provide enforcement of security policies and simplify the amount of software required to accomplish such enforcement. Access can be constrained on variables such as which users and applications can access which resources. In addition, SELinux access controls are determined by a policy loaded on the system that cannot be changed by uneducated users or insecure applications. SELinux also allows you to configure more granular access control policies. For instance, SELinux lets you specify who can unlink, append only, or move a file instead of only being able to specify who can read, write, or execute a file. It also allows you to configure access to many other resources in addition to files. For example, it allows you to specify access to network resources and interprocess communication (IPC).



Insecure SUDO Implementations

Sudo, which stands for “super user do,” is a Linux utility that allows a system administrator to give certain users or groups of users the ability to run some or all commands as root or superuser. The Sudo utility operates on a per-command basis, and it is not a replacement for the shell. You can also use the Sudo utility to restrict the commands a user can run on a per-host basis, to restrict logging of each command to have an audit trail of who did what, and to restrict the ability to use the same configuration file on different systems.

Example 7-7 shows the Linux command **groups** being used. The command shows the group that the user omar belongs to. You can see in this example that sudo is one of the groups that the user omar belongs to.

Example 7-7 The **groups** Command

```
omar@dionysus:~$ groups
omar adm cdrom sudo dip plugdev lxd sambashare lpadmin
```

Another command you can use to see the groups a user belongs to is the **id** command, as shown in Example 7-8.

Example 7-8 The **id** Command

```
omar@dionysus:~$ id
uid=1000(omar) gid=1000(omar) groups=1000(omar),4(adm),24(cdrom),
27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),110(lxd),113(sambashare),117(lpadmin)
```

Example 7-9 shows the same commands used when a different user (ron) is logged in. In this case, you can see that ron belongs only to the group ron.

Example 7-9 The Groups to Which User ron Belongs

```
ron@dionysus:~$ groups
ron
ron@dionysus:~$ id
uid=1001(ron) gid=1001(ron) groups=1001(ron)
ron@dionysus:~$
```

Certain Linux systems call this group the “wheel” group. If you want to add an existing user to the wheel (or sudo) group, you can use the **usermod** command with the

-G option. You might also want to use the **-a** option, to avoid removing the user from other groups to which he or she belongs, as shown in Example 7-10.

Example 7-10 The **usermod** Command

```
$ sudo usermod -a -G wheel ron
```

You can also add a user account to the wheel group as you create it, as shown in Example 7-11.

Example 7-11 Adding a User to the wheel Group at Creation

```
$ sudo useradd -G wheel chris
```

In many different Linux systems, you can also use the **visudo** command. Figure 7-7 shows the first few lines of the description of the **visudo** man page (**man visudo**).

```
VISUDO(8)                               BSD System Manager's Manual                               VISUDO(8)

NAME
    visudo - edit the sudoers file

SYNOPSIS
    visudo [-chqsV] [-f sudoers] [-x output_file]

DESCRIPTION
    visudo edits the sudoers file in a safe fashion, analogous to vipw(8). visudo locks the
    sudoers file against multiple simultaneous edits, provides basic sanity checks, and checks
    for parse errors. If the sudoers file is currently being edited you will receive a mes-
    sage to try again later.

There is a hard-coded list of one or more editors that visudo will use set at compile-time
that may be overridden via the editor sudoers Default variable. This list defaults to
/usr/bin/editor. Normally, visudo does not honor the VISUAL or EDITOR environment vari-
ables unless they contain an editor in the aforementioned editors list. However, if
visudo is configured with the --with-env-editor option or the env_editor Default variable
is set in sudoers, visudo will use any the editor defines by VISUAL or EDITOR. Note that
this can be a security hole since it allows the user to execute any program they wish sim-
ply by setting VISUAL or EDITOR.

visudo parses the sudoers file after the edit and will not save the changes if there is a
syntax error. Upon finding an error, visudo will print a message stating the line num-
ber(s) where the error occurred and the user will receive the "What now?" prompt. At this
point the user may enter 'e' to re-edit the sudoers file, 'x' to exit without saving the
changes, or 'Q' to quit and save changes. The 'Q' option should be used with extreme care
because if visudo believes there to be a parse error, so will sudo and no one will be able
to run sudo again until the error is fixed. If 'e' is typed to edit the sudoers file
after a parse error has been detected, the cursor will be placed on the line where the
error occurred (if the editor supports this feature).
Manual page visudo(8) line 1 (press h for help or q to quit)
```

FIGURE 7-7 The **visudo** Command Man Page

Example 7-12 shows the contents of the sudoers file after the **visudo** command is invoked.

Example 7-12 The sudoers File

```
# This file MUST be edited with the 'visudo' command as root.  
#  
# Please consider adding local content in /etc/sudoers.d/ instead of  
# directly modifying this file.  
#  
# See the man page for details on how to write a sudoers file.  
#  
Defaults env_reset  
Defaults mail_badpass  
Defaults secure_path="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/  
sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/snap/bin"  
# Host alias specification  
  
# User alias specification  
  
# Cmnd alias specification  
  
# User privilege specification  
root    ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL  
  
# Members of the admin group may gain root privileges  
%admin  ALL=(ALL) ALL  
  
# Allow members of group sudo to execute any command  
%sudo   ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL  
  
# See sudoers(5) for more information on "#include" directives:  
#includedir /etc/sudoers.d
```

The first highlighted line in Example 7-12 means that the root user can execute commands from ALL terminals, acting as ALL (that is, any) users, and can run the ALL command (any commands). The second highlighted line specifies that members of the admin group may gain root privileges and can also execute commands from all terminals, acting as ALL (any) users, and can run the ALL command (any commands). The third highlighted line specifies the same for any members of the group sudo.

A huge mistake that some people make is to copy and paste the root privileges and assign them to a user, as shown in Example 7-13.

Example 7-13 Improper sudoers File Entry

```
ben    ALL=(ALL:ALL)  ALL
```

In Example 7-13 the user ben has been assigned all the privileges of root. Attackers can take advantage of misconfigured sudoers files, like this one, to cause severe negative effects on a system. In most cases, you probably want a specific user to power off the system or just execute certain commands that will be required for the user to do certain tasks. Example 7-14 shows a better setup than Example 7-13: Because ben only needs to be able to power off the system, he has only been given that sudo capability.

Example 7-14 Allowing ben to Power Off the System

```
ben  ALL= /sbin/poweroff
```

As demonstrated in Example 7-15, you can also create aliases for users (User_Alias), run commands as other users (Runas_Alias), specify the host or network from which they can log in (Host_Alias), and specify the command (Cmnd_Alias).

Example 7-15 sudoers File Using Aliases

```
User_Alias      COOLGUYS = ben, chris, ron
Runas_Alias     LESSCOOL = root, operator
Host_Alias      COOLNET = 192.168.78.0/255.255.255.0
Cmnd_Alias      PRINT = /usr/sbin/lpc, /usr/bin/lprm

omar ALL=(LESSCOOL)  ALL
# The user omar can run any command from any terminal as any user in
# the LESSCOOL group (root or operator).

trina COOLNET=(ALL)  ALL
# The user trina may run any command from any machine in the COOLNET
# network, as any user.

ben ALL=PRINT
# The user ben may run lpc and lprm from any machine.
```

In Example 7-15 the alias COOLGUYS includes the users ben, chris, and ron. The alias LESSCOOL includes the users root and operator. The alias COOLNET includes the network 192.168.78.0/24, and the command alias PRINT includes the commands lpc and lprm.

TIP Sudo has been affected by several vulnerabilities that allow users to overwrite system configurations, run additional commands that should not be authorized, among other things. You can stay informed of any new vulnerabilities in Sudo at <https://www.sudo.ws/security.html>.

Key Topic

Ret2libc Attacks

A “return-to-libc” (or ret2libc) attack typically starts with a buffer overflow. In this type of attack, a subroutine return address on a call stack is replaced by an address of a subroutine that is already present in the executable memory of the process. This is done to potentially bypassing the no-execute (NX) bit feature and allow the attacker to inject his or her own code.

Operating systems that support non-executable stack help protect against code execution after a buffer overflow vulnerability is exploited. On the other hand, non-executable stack cannot prevent a ret2libc attack because in this attack, only existing executable code is used. Another technique, called *stack-smashing protection*, can prevent or obstruct code execution exploitation because it can detect the corruption of the stack and can potentially “flush out” the compromised segment.

A technique called *ASCII armoring* can be used to mitigate ret2libc attacks. When you implement ASCII armoring, the address of every system library (such as libc) contains a NULL byte (0x00) that you insert in the first 0x01010101 bytes of memory. This is typically a few pages more than 16 MB and is called the *ASCII armor region* because every address up to (but not including) this value contains at least one NULL byte. When this methodology is implemented, an attacker cannot place code containing those addresses using string manipulation functions such as `strcpy()`.

Of course, this technique doesn’t protect the system if the attacker finds a way to overflow NULL bytes into the stack. A better approach is to use the address space layout randomization (ASLR) technique, which mitigates the attack on 64-bit systems. When you implement ASLR, the memory locations of functions are random. ASLR is not very effective in 32-bit systems, though, because only 16 bits are available for randomization, and an attacker can defeat such a system by using brute-force attacks.

Windows Privileges

The following sections cover several methodologies and attacks for performing privilege escalation in Windows systems.

CPassword

Key Topic

Legacy Windows operating systems were susceptible to CPassword attacks. CPassword was a component of Active Directory's Group Policy Preferences that allowed administrators to set passwords via Group Policy. Microsoft patched this vulnerability in MS14-025 (see <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2014/ms14-025>). Microsoft also released a document explaining the vulnerability details, as well as well-known mitigations (see <https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2962486/ms14-025-vulnerability-in-group-policy-preferences-could-allow-elevati>).

If administrators use CPassword to perform common tasks (such as changing the local administrator account), any user with basic read rights to the SYSVOL directory can obtain the authentication key and crack it by using tools such as John the Ripper and Hashcat.

TIP A CPassword attack is also referred to as a *GPP attack*. To test and find vulnerable systems, you can just perform a keyword search for “cpassword” through all the files in the SYSVOL directory and modify or remove any Group Policy Objects (GPOs) that reference them. A GPO is a virtual compilation of policy settings. Each GPO is configured with a unique name, such as a GUID. You can obtain more information about GPOs at [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa374162\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa374162(v=vs.85).aspx). Microsoft has also published an article describing the SYSVOL implementation at <https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/24160.active-directory-back-to-basics-sysvol.aspx>.

You can automatically decrypt passwords that are stored in the Group Policy Preferences by using Metasploit, and you can use the Meterpreter post-exploitation module to obtain and decrypt CPassword from files stored in the SYSVOL directory. In addition, a number of PowerShell scripts can be used to perform this type of attack, such as the ones at <https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-GPPPassword.ps1>.



Clear-Text Credentials in LDAP

Unfortunately, many organizations still configure their Windows domain controllers to receive credentials in clear text over the network. One easy way to determine whether a system is affected by sending credentials in the clear is to look for event IDs 2886 and 2887 in the Active Directory Service log. Example 7-16 shows an example of Event 2886.

Example 7-16 Directory Service Event 2886

```
Log Name: Directory Service
Source: Microsoft-Windows-ActiveDirectory_DomainService
Date: 6/12/2018 3:08:11 AM
Event ID: 2886
Task Category: LDAP Interface
Level: Warning
Keywords: Classic
User: hacker
Computer: omar_workstation.sd.lan
Description:
The security of this directory server can be significantly enhanced by configuring the server to reject SASL (Negotiate, Kerberos, NTLM, or Digest) LDAP binds that do not request signing (integrity verification) and LDAP simple binds that are performed on a cleartext (non-SSL/TLS-encrypted) connection. Even if no clients are using such binds, configuring the server to reject them will improve the security of this server.

Some clients may currently be relying on unsigned SASL binds or LDAP simple binds over a non-SSL/TLS connection, and will stop working if this configuration change is made. To assist in identifying these clients, if such binds occur this directory server will log a summary event once every 24 hours indicating how many such binds occurred. You are encouraged to configure those clients to not use such binds. Once no such events are observed for an extended period, it is recommended that you configure the server to reject such binds.
```

If any domain controller has the 2886 event present, this indicates that LDAP signing is not being enforced by the domain controller, and it is possible to perform a simple (clear-text) LDAP bind over a non-encrypted connection.

TIP The tool at <https://github.com/russelltomkins/Active-Directory/blob/master/Query-InsecureLDAPBinds.ps1> can be used to query logs for insecure LDAP binds and clear-text passwords. Furthermore, the following post includes additional information about how such an attack could be performed: <https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz>.

Kerberoasting

Key Topic

Kerberoast is a series of tools for attacking Microsoft Kerberos implementations and Windows service accounts. The tool can be obtained from <https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast>.

TIP The post <https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/a-toast-to-kerberoast/> provides step-by-step instructions for remotely running a Kerberoast attack over an established Meterpreter session to a command and control server and cracking the ticket offline using Hashcat.

You will learn more about Meterpreter and Hashcat in Chapter 9, “Penetration Testing Tools.”

Credentials in Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS)

Key Topic

Another attack commonly performed against Windows systems involves obtaining user and application credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). It is possible to dump the LSASS process from memory to disk by using tools such as Sysinternals ProcDump. Attackers have been successful using ProcDump because it is a utility digitally signed by Microsoft. Therefore, this type of attack can evade many antivirus programs. ProcDump creates a minidump of the target process. An attacker can then use tools such as Mimikatz to mine user credentials.

TIP You can use the VMware tool vmss2core to dump memory from a suspended virtual machine (VM). You can easily identify a suspended VM by the file extension .vmss. You can also use the VMware tool vmss2core to dump memory from snapshotted VMs (*.vmsn). You can then use the Volatility Framework to extract the hashes. For more information about the Volatility Framework, see <http://www.volatilityfoundation.org>.

The following are additional resources related to the aforementioned attacks:

- **ProcDump and Windows Sysinternals:** <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump>
- **Mimikatz:** <http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz>
- **The Volatility Foundation:** <http://www.volatilityfoundation.org>
- **Vmss2core:** <https://labs.vmware.com/flings/vmss2core>
- **VMware Snapshot and Saved State Analysis:** <http://volatility-labs.blogspot.be/2013/05/movp-ii-13-vmware-snapshot-and-saved.html>

SAM Database



Microsoft Active Directory plays an important role in many organizations. Active Directory provides a directory service for managing and administering different domain activities. Active Directory is based on a client/server architecture. Understanding how Active Directory works and the underlying architecture is very important for any pen tester tasked with testing Windows environments.

Of course, one of the common tasks in a penetration testing engagement is to retrieve passwords from a Windows system and ultimately try to get domain administrator access. In Chapter 5, “Exploiting Wired and Wireless Networks,” you learned about the pass-the-hash attack technique and other attacks against Windows systems. As a refresher, Windows stores password hashes in three places:

- The Security Account Manager (SAM) database
- The LSASS
- The Active Directory database

All versions of Windows store passwords as hashes, in a file called the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) database.

NOTE The SAM database stores only hashes the passwords. Windows itself does not know what the passwords are.

The SAM database stores usernames and NT hashes in a %SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM file. This file contains all the hash values for accounts that are local to the computer.

Microsoft created its own hash process for its Windows operating systems. This is where the NT LAN Manager (NTLM) comes into play. NTLM is a suite of

Microsoft security protocols that have been proven to be vulnerable and used by many penetration testers as well as threat actors to compromise machines. Because password hashes cannot be reversed, instead of trying to figure out a user's password, you (or an attacker) can just use a password hash collected from a compromised system and then use the same hash to log in to another client or server system. This technique, called *pass-the-hash*, is illustrated in Figure 7-8.




FIGURE 7-8 Pass-the-Hash Attack Example

Microsoft now uses Kerberos in Windows domains, but NTLM is still used when the client is authenticating to a server in a different Active Directory forest that has a legacy NTLM trust instead of a transitive inter-forest trust. NTLM is also used when the client is authenticating to a server that doesn't belong to a domain and when Kerberos is blocked by a firewall or a similar device.

Understanding Dynamic Link Library Hijacking

Key Topic

Dynamic link libraries (DLLs) are common components in all versions of Windows. Some DLLs are loaded into applications when they start (if needed). DLLs interact with APIs and other operating system procedures. If you tamper with a system in order to control which DLL an application loads, you may be able to insert a malicious DLL during the DLL loading process to compromise the system. An application can decide the order of the directories to be searched for a DLL to load, depending on the configuration of the system. The following list shows the order of the Windows DLL search process:

- Step 1.** Windows searches the working directory from which the application is loaded.
- Step 2.** Windows searches the current directory (from which the user is working).

- Step 3.** Windows searches the system directory (typically \Windows\System32\). The **GetSystemDirectory** function is called to obtain this directory.
- Step 4.** Windows searches the 16-bit system directory.
- Step 5.** Windows searches the Windows directory. The **GetWindowsDirectory** function is called to obtain this directory.
- Step 6.** Windows searches directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable.

In this process, the attack relies on a program making a decision to load a DLL from the current directory (step 2). An attacker can manipulate that step and perform a DLL hijacking attack. For instance, if the user is opening an Excel spreadsheet, Microsoft Office attempts to load its DLL component from the location of that document file. An attacker can put a malicious DLL in that directory. Subsequently, Microsoft Office can carelessly load the malicious DLL.

TIP DLL hijack attacks are not as effective as they used to be. This is because Microsoft has released several patches and features that help prevent these types of attacks. The following article explains some of the mitigations: <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order>.



Exploitable Services

You as a pen tester can take advantage of exploitable services such as the following:

- **Unquoted service paths:** If an executable (application binary) is enclosed in quotation marks (""), Windows knows where to find it. On the contrary, if the path where the application binary is located doesn't contain any quotation marks, Windows will try to locate it and execute it inside every folder of this path until it finds the executable file. An attacker can abuse this functionality to try to elevate privileges if the service is running under SYSTEM privileges. A service is vulnerable if the path to the executable has a space in the filename and the filename is not wrapped in quotation marks; exploitation requires write permissions to the path before the quotation mark.
- **Writable services:** Administrators often configure Windows services that run with SYSTEM privileges. This could lead to a security problem because an attacker may obtain permissions over the service or over the folder where

the binary of the service is stored (or both). Services configured this way are also often found in third-party software (TPS) and may be used for privilege escalation.

Insecure File and Folder Permissions



An attacker can take advantage of unsecured and misconfigured file and folder permissions. Files and folders in Windows can have read and write permissions. These permissions are established strictly to specific users or groups. In contrast, Unix and Linux-based systems grant file and folder permissions to the owner, the group owner, or everybody. Windows uses specific permissions to allow users to access folder content. Windows does not use execute permissions on files. Windows uses the filename extension to determine whether a file (including a script file) can be run.

TIP For details on how Windows file security and access rights work, see <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/fileio/file-security-and-access-rights>. Microsoft has also published a detailed document explaining Windows access control lists at <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/secauthz/access-control-lists>.

Table 7-2 compares the permissions between Unix/Linux systems and Windows.

Table 7-2 A Comparison Between Permissions for Unix/Linux-Based Systems and Windows Systems

Unix/Linux	Windows
Read and write permissions on a folder in Unix is the same as the read and write permissions in Windows.	
The read and execute permissions on a file in Unix are the same as the read and execute permissions in Windows.	
Write permission on a file	Modify permission on a file
Execute permission on a folder	List Folder Contents permission
Read, write, and execute permissions on a file or folder	Full Control permission

Understanding Windows Group Policy

In Windows, Group Policy is a centralized administration feature for systems belonging to a Windows domain. This functionality allows you to create policies in Active Directory and assign them to users or systems. You create policies to

configure specific settings and permissions within the Windows operating system. The item inside Active Directory that contains these settings is called a Group Policy Object (GPO). GPOs can be used for user accounts, for client computer settings, or for configuring policies in servers. Typically, the goal is to configure GPOs in such a way that they cannot be overridden by users.

TIP Microsoft provides a series of spreadsheets and other documentation to help manage GPOs; see <http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=25250>. These spreadsheets list the policy settings for computer and user configurations that are included in the Administrative template files delivered with the specified Windows operating system. You can configure these policy settings when you edit GPOs. A brief example of one of these spreadsheets is shown in Figure 7-9.

C1	A	B	C	
1	Status	Policy Path	Policy Name	Supported O
2		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy	Enforce password history	At least Windows
3		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy	Maximum password age	At least Windows
4		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy	Minimum password age	At least Windows
5		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy	Minimum password length	At least Windows
6		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy	(Password must meet complexity requirement)	At least Windows
7		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy	Store passwords using reversible encryption for all users in the domain	At least Windows
8		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Account Policies\Account Lockout Policy	Account lockout duration	At least Windows
9		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Account Policies\Account Lockout Policy	Account lockout threshold	At least Windows
10		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Account Policies\Account Lockout Policy	Reset lockout counter after	At least Windows
11		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Kerberos Policy	Enforce user logon restrictions	At least Windows
12		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Kerberos Policy	Maximum lifetime for service ticket	At least Windows
13		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Kerberos Policy	Maximum lifetime for user ticket	At least Windows
14		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Kerberos Policy	Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal	At least Windows
15		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Kerberos Policy	Maximum tolerance for computer clock synchronization	At least Windows
16		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy	Audit account logon events	At least Windows
17		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy	Audit account management	At least Windows
18		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy	Audit directory service access	At least Windows
19		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy	Audit logon events	At least Windows
20		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy	Audit object access	At least Windows
21		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy	Audit policy change	At least Windows
22		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy	Audit privilege use	At least Windows
23		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy	Audit process tracking	At least Windows
24		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy	Audit system events	At least Windows
25		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment	Access this computer from the network	At least Windows
26		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment	Access Credential Manager as a trusted caller	At least Windows
27		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment	Act as part of the operating system	At least Windows
28		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment	Add workstations to a domain	At least Windows
29		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment	Adjust memory quotas for a process	At least Windows
30		Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Local Policies\User Rights Assignment	Allow log on locally	At least Windows

FIGURE 7-9 Group Policy Settings Reference for Windows and Windows Server

Keyloggers

An attacker may use a keylogger to capture every key stroke of a user in a system and steal sensitive data (including credentials). There are two main types of keyloggers: keylogging hardware devices and keylogging software. A hardware (physical) keylogger is usually a small device that can be placed between a user's keyboard and the main system. Software keyloggers are dedicated programs designed to track and log user keystrokes.

NOTE Keyloggers are legal in some countries and designed to allow employers to oversee the use of their computers. However, recent regulations like GDPR have made keyloggers a very sensitive and controversial topic. Threat actors use keyloggers for the purpose of stealing passwords and other confidential information.

There are several categories of software-based keyloggers:

- **Kernel-based keylogger:** A program on the machine obtains root access to hide itself in the operating system and intercepts keystrokes that pass through the kernel. This method is difficult both to write and to combat. Such keyloggers reside at the kernel level, which makes them difficult to detect, especially for user-mode applications that don't have root access. They are frequently implemented as rootkits that subvert the operating system kernel to gain unauthorized access to the hardware. This makes them very powerful. A keylogger using this method can act as a keyboard device driver, for example, and thus gain access to any information typed on the keyboard as it goes to the operating system.
- **API-based keylogger:** With this type of keylogger, compromising APIs reside inside a running application. Different types of malware have taken advantage of Windows APIs, such as `GetAsyncKeyState()` and `GetForegroundWindow()`, to perform keylogging activities.
- **Hypervisor-based keylogger:** This type of keylogger is effective in virtual environments, where the hypervisor could be compromised to capture sensitive information.
- **Web form-grabbing keylogger:** Keyloggers can steal data from web form submissions by recording the web browsing on submit events.
- **JavaScript-based keylogger:** Malicious JavaScript tags can be injected into a web application and then capture key events (for example, the `onKeyUp()` JavaScript function).
- **Memory-injection-based keylogger:** This type of keylogger tampers with the memory tables associated with the browser and other system functions.

Scheduled Tasks



Threat actors can take advantage of the Windows Task Scheduler to bypass User Account Control (UAC) if the user has access to its graphical interface. This is possible because the security option runs with the system's highest privileges. When a Windows user creates a new task, the system typically doesn't require the user to

authenticate with an administrator account. You can also use this functionality for post-exploitation and persistence.

NOTE You can access the scheduled tasks of a Windows system by navigating to **Start -> Programs -> Accessories -> System Tools -> Scheduled Tasks**.



Escaping the Sandbox

The term *sandbox* can mean different things depending on to the field. In cybersecurity, a sandbox allows you to isolate running applications to minimize the risk of software vulnerabilities spreading from one application to another. Figure 7-10 illustrates this sandboxing concept.




FIGURE 7-10 Sandboxes

Sandboxes can also be used to run untested or untrusted software from unverified or untrusted third parties, suppliers, users, or websites. In addition, they can be used to test malware without allowing the software to compromise the host system.

TIP Sandbox implementations typically operate and provide a controlled set of resources for guest applications to run in. These resources include a “scratch space” on disk and memory. Typically, network access is disallowed or highly restricted.

In web development, a sandbox is a mirrored production environment that developers use to create an application before migrating it to a production environment. Companies like Amazon, Google, and Microsoft, among others, provide sandboxing services.

NOTE For the purpose of this book, we of course concentrate on sandboxes related to cybersecurity.

The following are examples of sandbox implementations:

- **A jail:** This implementation is commonly used in mobile devices where there is restricted filesystem namespace and rule-based execution to not allow untrusted applications to run in the system. This is where the term jail-breaking comes in. Users may “jail-break” their phones to be able to install games and other applications. With a jail-broken phone, an attacker can more easily impersonate applications and deliver malware to the user because a jail-broken device does not have the security controls in place to prevent malware from running on the system.
- **Rule-based execution in SELinux and AppArmor security frameworks:** This implementation restricts control over what processes are started, spawned by other applications, or allowed to inject code into the system. These implementations can control what programs can read and write to the file system.
- **Virtual machines:** Virtual machines can be used to restrict a guest operating system to run sandboxed so that the applications do not run natively on the host system and can only access host resources through the hypervisor.
- **Sandboxing on native hosts:** Security researchers may use sandboxing to analyze malware behavior. Even commercial solutions such as Cisco’s ThreatGrid use sandbox environments that mimic or replicate the victim system to evaluate how malware infects and compromises such a system.
- **Secure Computing Mode (seccomp) and seccomp-bpf (seccomp extension):** These are sandboxes built in the Linux kernel to only allow the `write()`, `read()`, `exit()`, and `sigreturn()` system calls.
- **Software fault isolation (SFI):** This implementation uses sandboxing methods in all store, read, and jump assembly instructions to isolated segments of memory.
- **Web browsers:** Browsers provide sandboxing capabilities to isolate extensions and plugins.
- **HTML5:** HTML5 has a `sandbox` attribute for use with iframes.
- **Java virtual machines:** These VMs include a sandbox to restrict the actions of untrusted code, such as a Java applet.
- **.NET Common Language Runtime:** This implementation enforces restrictions on untrusted code.
- **Adobe Reader:** This implementation runs PDF files in a sandbox to prevent them from escaping the PDF viewer and tampering with the rest of the computer.
- **Microsoft Office:** Office has a sandbox mode to prevent unsafe macros from harming the system.

If an attacker finds a way to bypass (escape) the sandbox, he or she can then compromise other applications and potentially implement a full system compromise. Several sandbox escape vulnerabilities in the past have allowed attackers to do just that.

Key Topic

Virtual Machine Escape

In the previous section, you learned that VMs can be used to restrict a guest operating system to run sandboxed. This is because the applications do not run natively on the host system and can only access host resources through the hypervisor.

If an attacker finds a way to escape the VM, he or she can then compromise other VMs and potentially compromise the hypervisor. This is catastrophic in cloud environments, where multiple customers can be affected by these types of attacks. A VM escape attack is illustrated in Figure 7-11.




FIGURE 7-11 VM Escape

Understanding Container Security

A lot of people immediately think about Docker when they hear the word *containers*, but there are other container technologies out there. Linux Containers (LXC) is a well-known set of tools, templates, and library and language bindings for Linux containers. It's pretty low level and very flexible, and it covers just about every containment feature supported by the upstream kernel.

NOTE You can learn more about LXC at <https://linuxcontainers.org>.

Docker is really an extension of LXC's capabilities. A high-level API provides a lightweight virtualization solution to run different processes in isolation. Docker was developed in the Go language and utilizes LXC, cgroups, and the Linux kernel itself.

NOTE You can learn more about Docker at <https://www.docker.com>.

Another popular container technology or package is rkt (or Rocket). rkt aims to provide a feature and capability that its creators call “secure-by-default.” It includes a number of security features such as support for SELinux, TPM measurement, and running app containers in hardware-isolated VMs.

NOTE You can learn more about Rocket at <https://github.com/rkt/rkt>.

Cri-o is a lightweight container technology used and designed with Kubernetes. It provides support for containers based on the Open Container Initiative specifications (see <https://www.opencontainers.org>), a set of two specifications: the Runtime Specification (`runtime-spec`) and the Image Specification (`image-spec`). The `runtime-spec` outlines how to run a filesystem bundle that is unpacked on disk.

NOTE You can learn more about Cri-o at <http://cri-o.io>.

Another container package is called OpenVz. It is not as popular as Docker or Rocket, but it is making the rounds.

NOTE You can learn more about OpenVz at <https://openvz.org>.

What is a container? A container image is a lightweight, standalone, executable package of a piece of software that includes everything you need to run it, including code, the runtime, system tools, system libraries, and settings. Containers are available for Linux, Mac OS X, and Windows applications.

NOTE Containerized software will always run the same, regardless of the environment.

Containers isolate software from its surroundings and help reduce conflicts between teams running different software on the same infrastructure.

So what is the difference between a container and a virtual machine? Figure 7-12 provides a comparison.




FIGURE 7-12 VMs vs. Containers

Figure 7-12 shows the architectural differences between container and VM environments. A VM generally includes an entire operating system along with the application. It also needs a hypervisor running along with it to control the VM. VMs tend to be pretty big in size, since they include whole operating systems. Because of this, they take up several minutes to boot up the operating system and initialize the application they are hosting. Containers are much smaller; they perform much better than VMs and can start almost instantly.

One of the biggest advantages of container technologies is that containers can be created much faster than VM instances. Their lightweight footprint means less overhead in terms of performance and size. Containers increase developer productivity by removing cross-service dependencies and conflicts. Each container can be seen as a different microservice, and you can very easily upgrade them independently.

Each image of a container can be version controlled, so you can track different versions of a container. Containers encapsulate all the relevant details, such as application dependencies and operating systems. This makes them extremely portable across systems.

Docker and container technologies are supported by all major cloud providers, including Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform, and Microsoft Azure. In addition, Docker can be integrated with tools like Ansible, Chef, Puppet, Jenkins, Kubernetes, OpenStack, Vagrant, and dozens of other tools and infrastructures.



TIP Of course, this is not a book about Docker and containers. However, if you have never played with containers, you can easily download your favorite Linux distribution and install Docker. For example, in Ubuntu or even Kali Linux, you can simply install Docker with the `apt install docker.io` command.

Some of the most challenging issues with containers and DevOps are operational in nature. For example, due to the convenience and agility that containers bring to the table, developers often pull Docker containers from community repositories and stores not knowing what vulnerabilities they are inheriting in those containers. Asset discovery and container vulnerability management are therefore very important.

The following are a few examples of tools and solutions that have been developed throughout the years for container security:

- **Anchore:** Anchore is used to analyze container images for the presence of known security vulnerabilities and against custom security policies. It has both open source and commercial versions. You can obtain the open source code and more information about it from <https://github.com/anchore/anchore-engine>.
- **Aqua Security:** This is a commercial tool for securing container-based applications (see <https://www.aquasec.com>).
- **Bane:** This is an AppArmor profile generator for Docker containers. You can download it from <https://github.com/genuine-tools/bane>.
- **CIS Docker Benchmark:** This tool provides an automated way to test containers against well-known security best practices. You can download the CIS Docker Benchmark from <https://github.com/dev-sec/cis-docker-benchmark>.
- **Dev-Sec.io:** This tool allows you to automatically apply hardening best practices to different types of servers (see <https://dev-sec.io>).
- **Clair:** This is an open source static analysis for Docker containers from Core-OS. You can download Clair from <https://github.com/coreos/clair>.
- **Dagda:** This is another tool for performing static analysis of known vulnerabilities. You can download Dagda from <https://github.com/eliasgranderubio/dagda>.
- **docker-bench-security:** This script, created by Docker, checks for common security best practices when deploying Docker containers in production. You can download this tool from <https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-security>.

- **docker-explorer:** This tool was created by Google to help analyze offline Docker file systems. It can be useful when performing forensic analysis of Docker containers. You can download it from <https://github.com/google/docker-explorer>.
- **Notary:** This open source project includes a server and a client for running and interacting with trusted containers. Notary is maintained by The Update Framework (TUF). You can obtain more information about Notary from <https://github.com/theupdateframework/notary> and information about TUF from <https://theupdateframework.github.io>.
- **oscap-docker:** OpenSCAP (created by RedHat) includes the oscap-docker tool, which is used to scan Docker containers and images. OpenSCAP and the oscap-docker tool can be downloaded from <https://github.com/OpenSCAP/openscap>.



Mobile Device Security

Mobile device security is a hot topic today. Individuals and organizations are increasingly using mobile devices for personal use and to conduct official business. Because of this, the risk in mobile devices and applications continues to increase.

The OWASP organization created the Mobile Security Project to provide mobile application and platform developers, as well as security professionals, resources to understand cybersecurity risks and to build and maintain secure mobile applications. The OWASP Mobile Security Project website can be accessed at https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project.

OWASP often performs studies of the top mobile security threats and vulnerabilities. According to OWASP, the top 10 mobile security risks at the time of this writing are:

- Improper platform usage
- Insecure data storage
- Insecure communication
- Insecure authentication
- Insufficient cryptography
- Insecure authorization
- Client code quality
- Code tampering
- Reverse engineering
- Extraneous functionality

Mobile applications (apps) run either directly on a mobile device, on a mobile device web browser, or both. Mobile operating systems (such as Android and Apple iOS) offer software development kits (SDKs) for developing applications (such as those for games, productivity, business, and more). These mobile apps, referred to as *native apps*, typically provide the fastest performance with the highest degree of reliability and adhere to platform-specific design principles.

Mobile web apps are basically websites designed to look and feel like native apps. These apps are accessed by a user via a device's browser and are usually developed in HTML5 and responsive mobile frameworks. Another option, a hybrid app, executes like a native app, but a majority of its processes rely on web technologies.

A lot of attacks against mobile apps start with reverse engineering and then move into tampering with the mobile app. Reverse engineering involves analyzing the compiled app to extract information about its source code. The goal of reverse engineering is to understand the underlying code and architecture. Tampering is the process of changing a mobile app (either the compiled app or the running process) or its environment to affect its behavior. In order to perform good reverse engineering of mobile apps, you should become familiar with the mobile device processor architecture, the app executable format, and the programming language used to develop a mobile app.

Modern apps often include controls that hinder dynamic analysis. Certificate pinning and end-to-end (E2E) encryption sometimes prevent you from intercepting or manipulating traffic with a proxy. Root detection could prevent an app from running on a rooted device, preventing you from using advanced testing tools.

NOTE Mobile apps that implement the protections specified in the Mobile AppSec Verification Standard (MASVS) Anti-Reversing Controls should withstand reverse engineering to a certain degree. Details about MASVS can be accessed at https://www.owasp.org/images/6/61/MASVS_v0.9.4.pdf.

There are a few basic tampering techniques:

- **Binary patching (“modding”):** This involves changing the compiled app in binary executables or tampering with resources. Modern mobile operating systems such as iOS and Android enforce code signing to mitigate binary tampering.
- **Code injection:** This allows you to explore and modify processes at runtime. Several tools, including Cydia Substrate (<http://www.cydiasubstrate.com>), Frida (<https://www.frida.re>), and XPosed (<https://github.com/rovo89/XposedInstaller>), give you direct access to process memory and important structures such as live objects instantiated by the app.

- **Static and dynamic binary analysis:** This is done using disassemblers and decompilers to translate an app's binary code or bytecode back into a more understandable format. By using these techniques on native binaries, you can obtain assembler code that matches the architecture for which the app was compiled.
- **Debugging and tracing:** It is possible to identify and isolate problems in a program as part of the software development life cycle. The same tools used for debugging are valuable to reverse engineers even when identifying bugs is not their primary goal. Debuggers enable program suspension at any point during runtime, inspection of the process's internal state, and even register and memory modification.



Understanding Android Security

Android is a Linux-based open source platform developed by Google as a mobile operating system. Android is not only used in mobile phones and tablets but also in wearable products, TVs, and many other smart devices. Android-based solutions come with many pre-installed (“stock”) apps and support installation of third-party apps through the Google Play store and other marketplaces.

Android’s software stack is composed of several different layers (see <https://source.android.com/devices/architecture>). Each layer defines interfaces and offers specific services. At the lowest level, Android is based on a variation of the Linux kernel. On top of the kernel, the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) defines a standard interface for interacting with built-in hardware components. Several HAL implementations are packaged into shared library modules that the Android system calls when required. This is how applications interact with the device’s hardware (for instance, how a phone uses the camera, microphone, and speakers).

Android apps are usually written in Java and compiled to Dalvik bytecode, which is somewhat different from the traditional Java bytecode. The current version of Android executes this bytecode on the Android runtime (ART). ART is the successor to Android’s original runtime, the Dalvik virtual machine. The key difference between Dalvik and ART is the way the bytecode is executed (see <https://source.android.com/devices/tech/dalvik/>).

Android apps do not have direct access to hardware resources, and each app runs in its own sandbox (see <https://source.android.com/security/app-sandbox>). The Android runtime controls the maximum number of system resources allocated to apps, preventing any one app from monopolizing too many resources.

Even though the Android operating system is based on Linux, it doesn't implement user accounts in the same way other Unix-like systems do. In Android, the multiuser support of the Linux kernel extends to sandbox apps: With a few exceptions, each app runs as though under a separate Linux user, effectively isolated from other apps and the rest of the operating system.

TIP The file `android_filesystem_config.h` includes a list of the predefined users and groups to which system processes are assigned. User IDs (UIDs) for other applications are added as they are installed.

Android apps interact with system services such as the Android Framework and related APIs. Most of these services are invoked via normal Java method calls and are translated to IPC calls to system services that are running in the background. Examples of system services include the following:

- Network connectivity, including Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and NFC
- Cameras
- Geolocation (GPS)
- Device microphone

The framework also offers common security functions, such as cryptography.

The Android Package Kit (APK) file is an archive that contains the code and resources required to run the app it comes with. This file is identical to the original signed app package created by the developer. The installed Android apps are typically located at `/data/app/[package-name]`.

The following are some key Android files:

- **AndroidManifest.xml:** This file contains the definition of the app's package name, target, and minimum API version, app configuration, components, and user-granted permissions.
- **META-INF:** This file contains the application's metadata and the following three files:
 - **MANIFEST.MF:** This file stores hashes of the app resources.
 - **CERT.RSA:** This file stores the app's certificate(s).
 - **CERT.SF:** This file lists resources and the hash of the corresponding lines in the MANIFEST.MF file.

- **assets:** This directory contains app assets (files used within the Android app, such as XML files, JavaScript files, and pictures), which the AssetManager can retrieve.
- **classes.dex:** This directory contains classes compiled in the DEX file format that the Dalvik virtual machine/Android runtime can process. DEX is Java bytecode for the Dalvik virtual machine, and it is optimized for small devices.
- **lib:** This directory contains native compiled libraries that are part of the APK, such as the third-party libraries that are not part of the Android SDK.
- **res:** This directory contains resources that haven't been compiled into resources.arsc.
- **resources.arsc:** This file contains precompiled resources, such as XML files for layout.

AndroidManifest.xml is encoded into binary XML format, which is not readable with a text editor. However, you can unpack an Android app by using Apktool. When you run Apktool with the default command-line flags, it automatically decodes the manifest file to text-based XML format and extracts the file resources. The following are the typical decoded and extracted files:

- **AndroidManifest.xml:** This is the decoded manifest file, which can be opened and edited in a text editor.
- **apktool.yml:** This file contains information about the output of Apktool.
- **original:** This folder contains the MANIFEST.MF file, which stores information about the files contained in the JAR file.
- **res:** This directory contains the app's resources.
- **smalidea:** This is a Smali language plugin. Smali is a human-readable representation of the Dalvik executable. Every app also has a data directory for storing data created during runtime. Additional information about smalidea can be obtained from <https://github.com/JesusFreke/smali/wiki/smalidea>.
- **cache:** This location is used for data caching. For example, the WebView cache is found in this directory.
- **code_cache:** This is the location of the file system's application-specific cache directory that is designed for storing cached code. On devices running Lollipop or later Android versions, the system deletes any files stored in this location when the app or the entire platform is upgraded.
- **databases:** This folder stores SQLite database files generated by the app at runtime (for example, user data files).

- **files:** This folder stores regular files created by the app.
- **lib:** This folder stores native libraries written in C/C++. These libraries can have one of several file extensions, including .so and .dll (x86 support). This folder contains subfolders for the platforms for which the app has native libraries, including the following:
 - **armeabi:** Compiled code for all ARM-based processors
 - **armeabi-v7a:** Compiled code for all ARM-based processors, version 7 and above only
 - **arm64-v8a:** Compiled code for all 64-bit ARM-based processors, version 8 and above only
 - **x86:** Compiled code for x86 processors only
 - **x86_64:** Compiled code for x86_64 processors only
 - **mips:** Compiled code for MIPS processors
- **shared_prefs:** This folder contains an XML file that stores values saved via the SharedPreferences APIs.

Android leverages Linux user management to isolate apps. This approach is different from user management in traditional Linux environments, where multiple apps are often run by the same user. Android creates a unique UID for each Android app and runs the app in a separate process. Consequently, each app can access its own resources only. This protection is enforced by the Linux kernel. Typically, apps are assigned UIDs in the range 10000 and 19999. An Android app receives a user name based on its UID. For example, the app with UID 10188 receives the username u0_a188. If the permissions an app requested are granted, the corresponding group ID is added to the app's process. For example, the user ID of the app in this example is 10188. It belongs to the group ID 3003 (inet). That group is related to the android.permission.INTERNET permission in the application manifest.

Apps are executed in the Android Application Sandbox, which separates the app data and code execution from other apps on the device. This separation adds a layer of security. Installation of a new app creates a new directory named after the app package (for example, /data/data/[package-name]). This directory holds the app's data. Linux directory permissions are set such that the directory can be read from and written to only with the app's unique UID.

The process Zygote starts up during Android initialization. Zygote is a system service for launching apps. The Zygote process is a base process that contains all the core libraries the app needs. Upon launch, Zygote opens the socket /dev/socket/

zygote and listens for connections from local clients. When it receives a connection, it forks a new process, which then loads and executes the app-specific code.

In Android, the lifetime of an app process is controlled by the operating system. A new Linux process is created when an app component is started and the same app doesn't yet have any other components running. Android may kill this process when the process is no longer necessary or when it needs to reclaim memory to run more important apps. The decision to kill a process is primarily related to the state of the user's interaction with the process.

Android apps are made of several high-level components, including the following:

- Activities
- Fragments
- Intents
- Broadcast receivers
- Content providers and services

All these elements are provided by the Android operating system, in the form of pre-defined classes available through APIs.

TIP During development, an app is signed with an automatically generated certificate. This certificate is inherently insecure and is for debugging only. Most stores don't accept this kind of certificate for publishing; therefore, a certificate with more secure features must be created. When an application is installed on the Android device, PackageManager ensures that it has been signed with the certificate included in the corresponding APK. If the certificate's public key matches the key used to sign any other APK on the device, the new APK may share a UID with the preexisting APK. This facilitates interactions between applications from a single vendor. Alternatively, specifying security permissions for the Signature protection level is possible; this restricts access to applications that have been signed with the same key.

To perform detailed analysis of Android applications, you can download Android Studio. It comes with the Android SDK, an emulator, and an app to manage the various SDK versions and framework components. Android Studio also comes with the Android Virtual Device (AVD) Manager application for creating emulator images. You can download Android Studio from <https://developer.android.com/studio>.

Figure 7-13 shows a screenshot of an application called OmarsApplication being developed using Android Studio.




FIGURE 7-13 Android Studio

For dynamic analysis, you need an Android device to run the target app. In principle, however, you can do without a real Android device and test on the emulator. Figure 7-14 shows the Android emulator that comes with Android Studio.





FIGURE 7-14 Android Emulator

Testing on a real device makes for a smoother process and a more realistic environment. However, emulators provide a lot of convenience and flexibility.

Developers and users often root their real devices to get full control over the operating system and to bypass restrictions such as app sandboxing. These privileges in turn allow individuals to use techniques like code injection and function hooking more easily. Rooting is risky and can void the device warranty. You might end up “bricking” a device (rendering it inoperable and unusable) if you run into problems when rooting the device. More importantly, rooting a device creates additional security risks because built-in exploit mitigations are often removed.

TIP You should not root a personal device on which you store your private information. It is recommended to use a cheap, dedicated test device instead.

Figure 7-15 demonstrates how to use Apktool to decode and analyze the Android application OmarsApplication.



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled 'root@kali: /Downloads/app-release'. The terminal is running the command 'apktool d app-release.apk'. The output of the command is displayed, showing the decoding of the APK file into its component parts: resources, manifest, and classes. The terminal also shows the user navigating through the directory structure and viewing the decoded files.

```

root@kali:~/Downloads# apktool d app-release.apk
I: Using Apktool 2.3.1-dirty on app-release.apk
I: Loading resource table...
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources...
I: Loading resource table from file: /root/.local/share/apktool/framework/1.apk
I: Regular manifest package...
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values */* XMLs...
I: Baksmaling classes.dex...
I: Copying assets and libs...
I: Copying unknown files...
I: Copying original files...
root@kali:~/Downloads# ls
app_release app-release.apk vuln
root@kali:~/Downloads# cd app-release/
root@kali:~/Downloads/app-release# ls
AndroidManifest.xml original_res smali
root@kali:~/Downloads/app-release# cat AndroidManifest.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?><manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" packa
ge="org.h4cker.omar.omarsapplication">
<application android:allowBackup="true" android:appComponentFactory="android.support.v4.app.CoreComponentFactory" android:ic
on="@mipmap/ic_launcher" android:label="@string/app_name" android:roundIcon="@mipmap/ic_launcher_round" android:supportsRtl="true"
 android:theme="@style/AppTheme">
    <activity android:label="@string/app_name" android:name="org.h4cker.omar.omarsapplication.ItemListActivity" android:them
e="@style/AppTheme.NoActionBar">
        <intent-filter>
            <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
            <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
        </intent-filter>
    </activity>
    <activity android:label="@string/title_item_detail" android:name="org.h4cker.omar.omarsapplication.ItemDetailActivity" a
ndroid:parentActivityName="org.h4cker.omar.omarsapplication.ItemListActivity" android:theme="@style/AppTheme.NoActionBar">
        <meta-data android:name="android.support.PARENT_ACTIVITY" android:value="org.h4cker.omar.omarsapplication.ItemListAc
tivity"/>
    </activity>
</application>
root@kali:~/Downloads/app-release# 
```

FIGURE 7-15 Using Apktool

NOTE The source code for this sample application can be accessed at <https://github.com/The-Art-of-Hacking/art-of-hacking>.

A few tools and frameworks are designed to test Android-based systems and related applications:

- **Androick:** This collaborative research project allows any user to analyze an Android application. You can download Androick from <https://github.com/Flo354/Androick>.
- **NowSecure App Testing:** This is a mobile app security testing suite for Android and iOS mobile devices. There are two versions: a commercial edition and a community (free) edition. You can obtain more information about NowSecure from <https://www.nowsecure.com/solutions/mobile-app-security-testing>.
- **OWASP SeraphimDroid:** This privacy and device protection application for Android devices helps users learn about risks and threats coming from other Android applications. SeraphimDroid is also an application firewall for Android devices that blocks malicious SMS or MMS from being sent, Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) codes from being executed, or calls from being called without user permission and knowledge. You can obtain more information about SeraphimDroid from https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_SeraphimDroid_Project.

Understanding Apple iOS Security

Key Topic

The iOS operating system runs only in Apple mobile devices, including the iPhone, iPad, and iPods. Apple tvOS has inherited many architectural components and features from iOS. iOS apps run in a restricted environment and are isolated from each other at the file system level. iOS apps are also significantly limited in terms of system API access compared to macOS and other operating systems. Apple restricts and controls access to the apps that are allowed to run on iOS devices. The Apple App Store is the only official application distribution platform.

iOS apps are isolated from each other via the Apple sandbox and mandatory access controls defining the resources an app is allowed to access. iOS offers very few IPC options compared to Android, which significantly reduces the attack surface. Uniform hardware and tight hardware/software integration create another security advantage.

The iOS security architecture consists of six core features:

- Hardware security
- Secure boot
- Code signing

- Sandbox
- Encryption and data protection
- General exploit mitigations

Every iOS device has two built-in Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 256-bit keys (GID and UID). These keys are included in the application processor and secure enclave during manufacturing. There's no direct way to read these keys with software or debugging interfaces such as JTAG. The GID is a value shared by all processors in a class of devices that is used to prevent tampering with firmware files. The UID is unique to each device and is used to protect the key hierarchy that's used for device-level file system encryption. UIDs are not created during manufacturing, and not even Apple can restore the file encryption keys for a particular device.

The Apple secure boot chain consists of the kernel, the bootloader, the kernel extensions, and the baseband firmware. Apple has also implemented an elaborate DRM system to make sure that only Apple-approved code runs on Apple devices. FairPlay Code Encryption is applied to apps downloaded from the App Store. FairPlay was developed as a DRM for multimedia content purchased through iTunes.

The App Sandbox is an iOS sandboxing technology. It is enforced at the kernel level and has been a core security feature since the first release of iOS. All third-party apps run under the same user (mobile), and only a few system applications and services run as root. Regular iOS apps are confined to a container that restricts access to the app's own files and a very limited number of system APIs. Access to all resources (such as files, network sockets, IPCs, and shared memory) is controlled by the sandbox. In addition, iOS implements address space layout randomization (ASLR) and the eXecute Never (XN) bit to mitigate code execution attacks.

iOS developers cannot set device permissions directly; they do so by using APIs. The following are a few examples of APIs and resources that require user permission:

- Contacts
- Microphone
- Calendars
- Camera
- Reminders
- HomeKit
- Photos
- HealthKit
- Motion activity and fitness

- Speech recognition
- Location Services
- Bluetooth
- Media library
- Social media accounts

There are a few tools you can use to practice security testing on mobile devices. One of the most popular is the Damn Vulnerable iOS application, a project that provides an iOS application to practice mobile attacks and security defenses. It has a set of challenges that can be completed by an individual. Each challenge area corresponds to an in-depth article designed to teach the fundamentals of mobile security on the iOS platform. The following are examples of the challenges in the Damn Vulnerable iOS application:

- Insecure Data Storage
- Jailbreak Detection
- Runtime Manipulation
- Transport Layer Security
- Client-Side Injection
- Broken Cryptography
- Binary Patching
- Side Channel Data Leakage
- Security Decisions via Untrusted Input

A learning tool for iOS security that is very popular and maintained by OWASP is iGoat. iGoat was inspired by the OWASP WebGoat project and has a similar conceptual flow. iGoat is free software, released under the GPLv3 license. iGoat can be downloaded from https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_iGoat_Tool_Project.

Another tool is the MobiSec Live Environment Mobile Testing Framework. MobiSec is a live environment for testing mobile environments, including devices, applications, and supporting infrastructure. The purpose is to provide attackers and defenders the ability to test their mobile environments to identify design weaknesses and vulnerabilities. MobiSec can be downloaded from <https://sourceforge.net/projects/mobisec>.

MITRE started a collaborative research project focused on open source iOS security controls called iMAS. iMAS was created to protect iOS applications and data beyond the Apple-provided security model and reduce the attack surface of iOS mobile devices and applications. The source code for iMAS is available on GitHub at <https://github.com/project-imas>.

Understanding Physical Security Attacks

Physical security is a very important element when defending an organization against any security risk. The following sections provide an overview of physical device security and facilities/building security concepts.



Understanding Physical Device Security

Attackers with physical access to a device can perform a large number of attacks. Of course, device theft is one of the most common risks and the main reason it is important to encrypt workstations, laptops, and mobile devices as well as to enable remote wipe and remote recovery features. On the other hand, a few more sophisticated attacks and techniques can be carried out, including the following:

- **Cold boot attacks:** Cold boot is a type of side channel attack in which the attacker tries to retrieve encryption keys from a running operating system after using a cold reboot (system reload). Cold boot attacks attempt to compromise the data remanence property of DRAM and SRAM to retrieve memory contents that could remain readable in the seconds to minutes after power has been removed from the targeted system. Typically, this type of attack by using removable media to boot a different operating system used to dump the contents of pre-boot physical memory to a file.
- **Serial console debugging, reconnaissance, and tampering:** Many organizations use terminal servers (serial console servers) to allow remote access to the serial port of another device over a network. These devices provide remote access to infrastructure devices (for example, routers, switches), servers, and industrial control systems. They are also used to provide out-of-band access to network and power equipment for the purpose of recovery in the case of an outage. Many serial devices do not require authentication and instead assume that if you are physically connected to a serial port, you probably are assumed to be allowed to configure and connect to the system. Clearly, this can be abused by any attacker to gain access to a victim system. Even if terminal servers may allow you to connect using a non-privileged account, attackers can use unprotected serial consoles for reconnaissance and debugging to then perform further attacks on the targeted system.
- **JTAG debugging, reconnaissance, and tampering:** JTAG is a hardware access interface that allows a penetration tester to perform debugging of hardware implementations. Debuggers can use JTAG access registers, memory contents, and interrupts, and they can even pause or redirect software instruction flows. JTAG can be an effective attack research tool because it allows debugging software (such as OpenOCD) control over a JTAG interface. OpenOCD can be used to manipulate the JTAG's TAP controller and to send

bits to a state machine with the goal of the chip being able to interpret them as valid commands. These types of tools allow you to debug firmware and software in devices via the GNU Project Debugger (GDB) or even interact with other tools like IDA Pro and other disassemblers and debuggers.

Clearly, an attacker with physical access to the targeted system has an advantage. Physical security to protect buildings and facilities is therefore crucial. In the next section, you will learn details about different physical security threats and attacks against buildings and facilities.

Protecting Your Facilities Against Physical Security Attacks

Key Topic

Numerous types of attacks can be carried to infiltrate facilities and to steal sensitive information from an organization. The following are some of the most common of them:

- **Piggybacking/tailgating:** An unauthorized individual may follow an authorized individual to enter a restricted building or facility.
- **Fence jumping:** An unauthorized individual may jump a fence or a gate to enter a restricted building or facility.
- **Dumpster diving:** An unauthorized individual may search for and attempt to collect sensitive information from the trash.
- **Lockpicking:** An unauthorized individual may manipulate or tamper with a lock to enter a building or obtain access to anything that is protected by a lock. Lock bypass is a technique used in lockpicking. Locks may be bypassed in many ways, including by using techniques such as simple loiding attempts (using a “credit card” or similar items against self-closing “latch” locks) and bypassing padlocks by shimming.
- **Egress sensors:** Attackers may tamper with egress sensors to open doors.
- **Badge cloning:** Attackers may clone the badges of employees and authorized individuals to enter a restricted facility or a specific area in a building. One of the most common techniques is to clone radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags (refer to Chapter 5).

Exam Preparation Tasks

As mentioned in the section “How to Use This Book” in the Introduction, you have a couple of choices for exam preparation: the exercises here, Chapter 11, “Final Preparation,” and the exam simulation questions in the Pearson Test Prep software online.

Review All Key Topics

Review the most important topics in this chapter, noted with the Key Topics icon in the outer margin of the page. Table 7-3 lists these key topics and the page number on which each is found.

Table 7-3 Key Topics for Chapter 7



Key Topic Element	Description	Page Number
Summary	Understanding insecure service and protocol configurations	281
Summary	Understanding local privilege escalation	285
Summary	Understanding Linux permissions	286
Summary	Changing Linux permissions and understanding sticky bits	288
Summary	Understanding SUID or SGID and Unix programs	291
Summary	Identifying insecure Sudo implementations	294
Summary	Understanding ret2libc attacks	298
Summary	Defining CPassword	299
Summary	Abusing and obtaining clear-text LDAP credentials	300
Summary	Understanding Kerberoasting	301
Summary	Compromising credentials in Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) implementations	301
Summary	Understanding and attacking the Windows SAM database	302
Summary	Understanding dynamic link library (DLL) hijacking	303
Summary	Abusing exploitable services	304
Summary	Exploiting insecure file and folder permissions	305
Summary	Defining and understanding keyloggers	306
Summary	Defining and understanding scheduled tasks	307
Summary	Understanding sandbox escape attacks	308
Summary	Understanding virtual machine (VM) escape attacks	310
Summary	Identifying container security challenges	313
Summary	Understanding the top mobile security threats and vulnerabilities	314
Summary	Understanding Android security	316
Summary	Understanding Apple iOS security	323
Summary	Understanding cold boot attacks, serial console, and JTAG debugging reconnaissance and tampering	326
Summary	Understanding physical security attacks	327

Define Key Terms

Define the following key terms from this chapter and check your answers in the glossary:

piggybacking, tailgating, fence jumping, dumpster diving, lockpicking, lock bypass, JTAG, sandbox, keylogger, Group Policy Object (GPO), Kerberoast, CPassword, Ret2libc

Q&A

The answers to these questions appear in Appendix A. For more practice with exam format questions, use the Pearson Test Prep software online.

1. Which of the following involves an unauthorized individual searching and attempting to collect sensitive information from the trash?
 - a. Piggybacking
 - b. Fence jumping
 - c. Dumpster diving
 - d. Lockpicking
2. Which of the following is a technique that is executed using disassemblers and decompilers to translate an app's binary code or bytecode back into a more or less understandable format?
 - a. Static and dynamic binary analysis
 - b. Static and dynamic source code analysis
 - c. Binary patching, or "modding"
 - d. Binary code injection
3. Which of the following is a sandbox built in the Linux kernel to only allow the `write()`, `read()`, `exit()`, and `sigreturn()` system calls?
 - a. SUDI
 - b. Seccomp
 - c. SELinux
 - d. Linux-jail

4. Which of the following statements is not true?
 - a. Modern web browsers provide sandboxing capabilities to isolate extensions and plugins.
 - b. HTML5 has a sandbox attribute for use with iframes.
 - c. Java virtual machines include a sandbox to restrict the actions of untrusted code, such as a Java applet.
 - d. Microsoft's .NET Common Language Runtime cannot enforce restrictions on untrusted code.
5. Which of the following can attackers use to capture every keystroke of a user in a system and steal sensitive data (including credentials)?
 - a. RATs
 - b. Keybinders
 - c. Keyloggers
 - d. Ransomware
6. Which of the following functionalities can an attacker abuse to try to elevate privileges if the service is running under SYSTEM privileges?
 - a. Unquoted service paths
 - b. Unquoted PowerShell scripts
 - c. Writable SYSTEM services using the **GetSystemDirectory** function
 - d. Cross-site scripting (XSS)
7. Which of the following is not a place where Windows stores password hashes?
 - a. SAM database
 - b. LSASS
 - c. PowerShell hash store
 - d. AD database
8. Which of the following is an open source tool that allows an attacker to retrieve user credential information from the targeted system and potentially perform pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket attacks?
 - a. SAM Stealer
 - b. Mimikatz
 - c. Kerberoast
 - d. Hashcrack

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