| PrintNumber | ErrorLocation | Error | Correction | DateAdded |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | pii | © 2011 by Pearson Education, Inc. | © 2011 by Jim McTague | 3/24/2011 |
| 1 | pii | First Printing March 2011 | TBD | 4/27/2011 |
| 1 | p11 | When they went to hit a bid on certain exchanges, the price suddenly disappeared and a lower bid instantly appeared in its place. | When they went to hit a bid on certain exchanges, the price suddenly disappeared and either a lower or higher bid instantly appeared in its place. | 4/27/2011 |
| 1 | p12 | If they discovered that a mutual fund or a pension fund was attempting to accumulate a large position in a stock, they would front-run the order, buying up the shares ahead of the bigger buyer and then selling it to them for a cent or two more than it would have paid if its intentions had remained secret. To avoid predation, cagey traders like Arnuk and Saluzzi employed numerous strategies to camouflage both their identities and their order size. If a big mutual fund wanted to sell several hundred thousand shares of a stock to rebalance its portfolio, it might use a trusted broker as an intermediary to locate another, equally large institution to buy its position at a negotiated price. It was hush-hush. Blabbermouths were excluded from such arrangements. If a large counterparty could not be found, the fund’s traders might take a portion of the order to a so-called dark pool, an off-exchange venue where block traders anonymously submit buy and sell orders, hoping to get at least a portion of the order executed. |
If they discovered that a mutual fund or a pension fund was attempting to accumulate a large position in a stock, they would front-run the order, buying up the shares ahead of the bigger buyer and then selling the shares to him for a cent or two more than he would have paid if his intentions had remained secret. To avoid predation, mutual funds employed numerous strategies to camouflage both their identities and their order size. If a big mutual fund wanted to sell several hundred thousand shares of a stock to rebalance its portfolio, they might use a trusted broker as an intermediary to locate another, equally large institution to buy the position at a negotiated price. It was hush-hush. Blabbermouths were excluded from such arrangements. If a large counterparty could not be found, they might take a portion of the order to a so-called dark pool, an off-exchange venue where block traders anonymously submit buy and sell orders, hoping to get at least a portion of the order executed. |
4/27/2011 |
| 1 | p21 | ...quickly plunged back into the market offering to buy the same stock at a penny above the institution’s original $20.00 bid. | ...would quickly plunge back into the market, offering to buy the same stock at a penny above the institution’s original $20.00 bid. | 4/27/2011 |
| 1 | p42 | The argument was on the propriety of Direct Edge’s use of “flash orders” to attract high-frequency traders to the exchange. | The argument was over the propriety of Direct Edge’s use of “flash orders” to attract high-frequency traders to the exchange. | 4/27/2011 |
| 1 | p50 | Kaufman was especially critical of former Congressman Christopher Cox of California, a Republican whom President George Bush had named as his Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). | Kaufman was especially critical of former Congressman Christopher Cox of California, a Republican whom President George Bush had named as his Securities and Exchange Commissioner. | 4/27/2011 |
| 1 | p108 | Regulators taxed the NYSE with establishing capital standards for member firms and auditing them for compliance. | Years earlier, regulators had taxed the NYSE with establishing capital standards for member firms and auditing them for compliance. | 4/27/2011 |
| 1 | p127 | By selling heavily in the futures pits, the computer guided, portfolio insurance firms would create a gap between the cache and futures markets that in turn would trigger index arbitrage in the form of purchases in the pits and sales on the floor. | By selling heavily in the futures pits, the computer guided, portfolio insurance firms would create a gap between the cash and futures markets that in turn would trigger index arbitrage in the form of purchases in the pits and sales on the floor. | 4/28/2011 |
| 1 | p130 | Here had been a hike in the prime rate by New York’s Chemical Bank and comments by Treasury Secretary Jim Baker suggesting the administration would embrace a weak dollar policy. | There had been a hike in the prime rate by New York’s Chemical Bank and comments by Treasury Secretary Jim Baker suggesting the administration would embrace a weak dollar policy.. | 4/28/2011 |
| 1 | p131 | (This was the era before the World Wide Web. The SEC didn’t approve delivery of mutual fund prospectuses to customers via the Internet until 2008.) | (This was the era before the World Wide Web. The SEC didn’t approve delivery of mutual fund prospectuses to customers via the Internet until 2008, let alone allow electronic trading.) | 4/28/2011 |