

Face-Off in the Gulf

Mark Trevelyan

"To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take."

President George W. Bush
in an address to the United Nations,
September 12, 2002

"We are preparing for war as if war will break out in one hour, and we are psychologically ready for that."

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein,
November 3, 2002

The Case for War

The sense of expectation at United Nations headquarters was palpable. A year and a day after Arab suicide squads crashed hijacked airliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush was due to deliver a crucial speech that could open a fresh chapter in his war on terror. World leaders in his audience could find themselves

“squirming in some of the seats,” a senior administration official warned beforehand. Bush would be blunt.

At home and abroad, it had been an anxious few days. The anniversary of September 11 had revived traumatic memories and fears of fresh attacks on America. Vice President Dick Cheney was at a secret location. Heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles were deployed around Washington in an operation codenamed Noble Eagle. A number of U.S. embassies around the world were closed for security reasons. Airlines slashed their schedules as passengers chose not to fly on September 11, fearing a spectacular new coup by the authors of the original attacks. Chief suspect Osama bin Laden and most of the top lieutenants in his al Qaeda network were believed to be still alive, scattered but elusive, and capable of posing a lethal threat.

But the U.S. president made no mention of bin Laden. In a speech of 2,700 words, he named al Qaeda just once. Instead, Bush devoted almost his entire address to warning the world of what he saw as the threat from one country: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. He painted a detailed picture of a brutal and devious dictator who had defied the international community for 12 years, breaking his

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Saddam Hussein presides over what appeared to be the biggest military parade in Baghdad since the 1991 Gulf War, greeting the massed ranks with gunfire, December 31, 2000. REUTERS

promises and defying U.N. resolutions aimed at forcing him to disarm. Saddam, said Bush, was relentlessly pursuing weapons of mass destruction.

“The first time we may be completely certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, he uses one,” Bush said. He outlined a nightmare scenario—“our greatest fear”—in which an “outlaw regime” like Saddam’s might supply doomsday weapons to a terrorist group.

The emphasis on Saddam came as no surprise for those who tracked U.S. policy. Bush and leading figures in his administration had inexorably turned their sights on Iraq as part of a gradual but critically important shift in U.S. security doctrine since September 11, 2001. It was his conscious choice to restore Iraq to the very top of the U.S. agenda and actively seek to bring about “regime change,” a U.S. policy first stated under his predecessor Bill Clinton. By a quirk of history, he found himself in a position to complete the unfinished business of his father, President George Bush senior, who routed Saddam’s forces in the 1991 Gulf War but left the Iraqi leader in power.

As the younger Bush built up pressure on Saddam, underpinned by the threat of U.S.-led military action, there were parallels with, but also sharp differences from the build-up to his father’s war. In 1991, the justification under international law was clear, and the arguments were easier to sell to the Arab world and the wider international community. War had to be fought to reverse an act of aggression—Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait—and drive the occupying troops out.

More than a decade later, Washington’s case is built around the alleged potential for future Iraqi aggression and the argument that such threats must be crushed before they materialize. Opponents see this as morally flawed, in breach of international law and fraught with the danger of destabilizing the whole of the Middle East. Some, including Iraq itself, say America’s real agenda is to gain control over Iraq’s vast oil reserves.

But Bush, driven by the imperatives of his war on terror, has invested much of his personal credibility in the campaign to remove Saddam. If he is determined to go ahead, there is little to stop him. In

the post-Cold War world, the United States enjoys unquestioned military pre-eminence. And since the attacks of September 11, 2001, that domination has been underpinned by a sharper sense of purpose and the willingness to go it alone, when required, to pursue U.S. security interests anywhere in the world.

Many of the risks confronting Bush are the same as those his father chose not to run in 1991—U.S. military and Iraqi civilian casualties; massive refugee flows; civil war in Iraq, with its volatile ethnic and religious mix; the export of instability to Turkey, Syria, Iran and beyond; the difficulty of installing a democratic government in Baghdad and the prospect of a costly and open-ended U.S. commitment, both military and financial, to shore it up. Other dangers are potentially even greater now than then. With Arabs already seething over U.S. backing for Israel in its two-year struggle against a Palestinian uprising, war on Iraq could fuel anti-American rage across the region of the very kind that inspired the September 11 attacks. Bush, some fear, could be playing right into bin Laden's hands.

If the U.S. president is prepared to run such risks, it may be because the dangers of failing to act, as he sees them, are even greater—but also because the potential rewards are enticing. If “regime change” works in Iraq, some analysts argue, the United States may not stop there. Saddam is not the only Arab leader that Bush wants to see gone. He has called already for the removal of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, whom Israel accuses of failing to rein in suicide bombers, and urged Arafat's people to elect new leaders “not compromised by terror.” Others could join Saddam and Arafat on that list. In a vision only hinted at by Bush, but explicitly outlined by some prominent U.S. conservatives, Iraq could be just the first step in a U.S.-led drive to re-engineer the Middle East along democratic, free-market lines and

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Taken from the roof of the International Press Center in Baghdad, this picture shows Iraqi anti-aircraft guns firing at U.S. and British warplanes carrying out strikes on the city under Operation Desert Fox, December 19, 1998. REUTERS

remake a region whose vast oil wealth—of huge strategic importance to the United States—has been mainly exploited for the benefit of narrow elites.

“Saddam’s replacement by a decent Iraqi regime would open the way to a far more stable and peaceful region,” Pentagon adviser Richard Perle said in a British newspaper interview. “A democratic Iraq would be a powerful refutation of the patronizing view that Arabs are incapable of democracy.”

The stakes could not be higher. A quick, decisive war with Iraq could help vindicate the new, assertive American doctrine of preemptive military action and entrench it for decades to come. But if war drags on, Bush risks a wider conflagration that would not only doom his own presidency but could spread turmoil throughout the region and provoke more attacks by extremists, the very opposite of what he is trying to achieve.

The Bush Doctrine

In truth, Iraq has never been off the U.S. agenda since the 1991 Gulf War. But for the ensuing decade, Washington was content for the most part to keep Saddam “in his box”—tying him down with sanctions and isolating him as an international pariah.

Two things changed that. The first was the arrival of a Republican administration with unfinished business with Iraq and the second was September 11. When the Arab hijackers turned commercial airliners into missiles and smashed them into New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon, they struck at the nerve centers of U.S. financial, political and military power. Another plane which could have caused further chaos

crashed in a field in Pennsylvania after passengers apparently rushed the hijackers.

Americans had suffered deadly attacks abroad—in the Middle East and East Africa, for example—but never before had they sustained such a devastating blow on mainland U.S. soil. America's view of the world was transformed, and so too was the Bush presidency. A leader who had taken power with an overwhelmingly domestic agenda was forced to rededicate his presidency to one central international mission, the war on terror. The overriding goal was the pursuit of bin Laden and al Qaeda. America would act alongside allies where it could, but alone where needed. Relations with every country would be governed by the requirements of this war: "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists," the president declared. Bush would root out enemies and threats to the United States, wherever they arose in the world. He began in Afghanistan, where the United States threw its weight behind the opposition Northern Alliance. The ruling Taliban, sponsors and hosts of al Qaeda, were quickly routed by the combination of U.S. air power and Northern Alliance forces on the ground.

A defining moment came with Bush's State of the Union speech in January 2002. The Taliban were vanquished, al Qaeda dispersed, and the bin Laden trail had gone cold. The name of Osama, the enemy whom Bush had denounced as the "evil one" and wanted "dead or alive," was mentioned increasingly rarely by U.S. officials. Where was the war on terror going from here?

Enter the "Axis of Evil." It was in this speech that Bush first coined that term and applied it to three countries—Iraq, Iran and North Korea—which he accused of developing weapons of mass destruction. At a

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Iraqi women shout and cry in the village of Jassan after U.S. and British air strikes, August 18, 1999. The U.S. military's Southern Command said the raids took place after Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery fired at Western planes. REUTERS

stroke, Bush was widening the definition of the war on terror: the fight against weapons proliferation would now be a crucial part of the struggle. In a June 1, 2002, speech at West Point military academy, Bush developed his new doctrine further, stressing the need for pre-emptive military action where necessary to stop “terrorists and tyrants” from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”

The fullest expression of America's new security stance came in a strategy report released on September 20, 2002. Building on the West Point theme, the administration affirmed the need to defeat terrorism by "destroying the threat before it reaches our borders." It went further: moving away from traditional Cold War policies of containment and deterrence, the United States asserted its own military pre-eminence and the need to prevent its rivals from matching it.

"Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States," the document said.

Many aspects of these new policies drew criticism. Opponents condemned the "Axis of Evil" as a distortion, implying an alliance between the three named countries that did not exist in reality. Rather like Bush's Wild West-style "dead or alive" rhetoric toward bin Laden, critics saw it as reflecting a naïve, simplistic view of a world divided between good guys and bad guys. To America's enemies and even some of its friends, the new U.S. strategy showed a worrying unilateralist, even imperialist, streak. But the switch reflected a strong sense among Americans that previous security mechanisms had failed and needed replacing. September 11 had exposed a need for new thinking. Increasingly it began to look as though Iraq would provide the first test of the Bush doctrine.

Why Iraq, Why Now?

Back in 1991, Saddam had promised an epic struggle, the Mother of All Battles, as the U.S.-led coalition assembled a massive army to drive him out of Kuwait. It turned out to be a grotesque mismatch. On January 17,

Post-Gulf War Chronology

1991

- Feb 28** U.S. and allied forces cease fire.
- Apr 7** The United States, Britain and France set up a "no-fly zone" north of the 36th parallel.
- Apr 11** The United Nations declares formal Gulf War ceasefire.
- Jun 9** The U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) starts chemical weapons inspections.
- Jun 28** Iraqi soldiers fire shots into the air when U.N. inspectors try to photograph a speeding convoy carrying crates of nuclear-related material.

1993

- Jun** U.S. warships fire 23 cruise missiles at Baghdad, destroying Iraqi intelligence service headquarters wing. Missiles kill six people. Attack ordered to avenge alleged Iraqi plot to kill former U.S. President George Bush.

1995

- Jul 1** Iraq admits for the first time that it has biological weapons.

1996

- Dec 10** The oil for food deal comes into effect, allowing Iraq to sell \$2 billion worth of oil for six months to buy humanitarian supplies for its people.

1997

- Oct 29** Iraq bars Americans from weapons teams.

1998

- Aug 9** UNSCOM suspends inspections of new sites after Baghdad decides to halt cooperation with United Nations.
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Nov 14/15 President Clinton halts two planned air strikes after Iraq offers to let inspections resume.

Dec 16 United Nations inspectors are withdrawn from Baghdad.

Dec 17 United States and Britain stage four days of air strikes at Iraqi factories, political, military and intelligence headquarters as punishment for not cooperating with inspectors.

2000

Mar 26 President Saddam Hussein meets outgoing U.N. relief coordinator Hans von Sponeck, the first time he has met an Iraqi-based U.N. official since the 1991 Gulf War.

2002

Jan 29 In a speech, President George W. Bush says Iran, Iraq and North Korea form an “axis of evil” developing weapons of mass destruction; all three reject the accusation the next day.

Sep 12 Bush challenges U.N. General Assembly to disarm Iraq or the United States would do it alone.

Sep 16 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan receives a letter from the Iraqi authorities agreeing to allow the return of U.N. inspectors without conditions.

Oct Mohammed Aldouri, Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations, says that 1.7 million people have died as a result of U.N. sanctions.

Oct 12 An adviser to Saddam sends a letter to U.N. weapons inspectors saying Iraq is ready to remove all obstacles to a return of inspectors after nearly four years.

Nov 8 U.N. Security Council unanimously approves resolution directing Iraq to disarm or face “serious consequences” and giving inspectors new rights.

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Nov 13 Iraq accepts U.N. resolution in an angry letter to Annan.

Nov 18 Advance party of U.N. inspectors land in Baghdad for first time in four years.

U.S.-led forces began weeks of air and missile attacks. On February 24 they followed up with a ground offensive that lasted exactly 100 hours. With Iraqi forces fleeing in disarray, Bush senior called a halt to military operations from midnight Washington time on February 27, 1991. The Gulf War had ended in a crushing victory for the United States and its allies: less than seven months after invading Kuwait, Iraqi troops had been routed and expelled.

The United States could have gone further. In purely military terms, there was no question that it could have pursued the retreating Iraqis all the way to Baghdad. General Norman Schwarzkopf declared victory at a news conference, dubbed the “mother of all briefings,” and said his forces could have overrun the country unopposed if that had been their intention.

But there were compelling political reasons to stop the war. President George Bush senior had painstakingly assembled a wide coalition—including traditional Arab foes such as Syria—for the express purpose of liberating Kuwait, not toppling Saddam. Ousting him would have gone far beyond the terms of United Nations resolutions. It would have meant higher U.S. casualties. There was no clear vision of who or what would replace him, and any successor government would have required substantial, costly and open-ended support, both military and financial. Not only did Bush call off the land war, but he declined to throw U.S. support behind the Kurds of



An Iraqi soldier gestures to weapons inspectors as they drive out of U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, November 23, 1998. REUTERS

northern Iraq or the Shias in the south, both of whom launched uprisings against Saddam almost as soon as the Gulf war was over. Successful revolts by either group would have carried unpredictable consequences and risks for both Iraq and its neighbors. Better for the United States to declare “mission accomplished” and withdraw its forces quickly from the region. In any case, many assumed Saddam was already fatally weakened and on the verge of being toppled. “We thought Saddam Hussein would leave power,” Bush senior said in a speech in October 2002.

That assumption with hindsight proved at best naïve. Twelve years of sanctions failed to break Saddam. A U.N.-administered “oil for food” program allowed Iraq to export oil in order to buy essential goods, but glaring shortages of medicines caused indisputable suffering and handed a propaganda opportunity to the Iraqis, who blamed the sanctions for the deaths of 1.7 million people.

More than a decade after the war, Bush junior had personal as well as political motives for preoccupying himself with Saddam. In his U.N. speech, he alluded to Iraq's attempt to kill “a former American president” in a plot foiled by U.S. intelligence in Kuwait in 1993. On another occasion he spoke of the episode—and Saddam—in more personal terms: “After all, this is the guy who tried to kill my dad.” Two other top figures in his administration had cause to see the Gulf War as unfinished business: Vice President Cheney had been defense secretary under Bush senior, while Secretary of State Colin Powell was the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the wake of September 11, Bush and his Republican team saw a new opportunity to go after Saddam and remove this thorn in their side. Buoyed by strong public support, heightened patriotism and a bipartisan political consensus, they spotted a chance to test and validate their new security doctrine. “Before September 11 there would really have been no chance whatsoever of mobilizing the American people or the Congress behind a unilateral attack on Iraq or indeed any kind of pre-emptive strike against Iraq. It would just have been politically out of the question,” said Anatol Lieven of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. “They're trying to use the nationalist energy generated by September 11 to carry a war with Iraq.”



Former U.N. arms inspector Scott Ritter avoids walking on a portrait of former President George Bush as he enters the al-Rashid hotel in Baghdad, July 29, 2000. Ritter arrived in Baghdad to film a documentary about weapons sites and the impact of U.N. sanctions.

REUTERS

Domestic political considerations came into the equation. With an eye to his own re-election chances in 2004, the war on terror provided Bush with a unifying national cause, and he built up broad popular backing. He had fashioned it into the defining theme of his presidency, and opponents risked being branded unpatriotic or wimpish. Amid global and U.S. economic malaise, a prolonged stock-market downturn and a spate of corporate scandals, decisive leadership and defense of America's security interests were his strongest political asset.

Against this background, Bush began to set out before the American people and the world community a case for possible war against Iraq. Much of it was laid out in his U.N. speech on September 12, in which he declared: "Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger." It was reinforced by Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush's closest ally, in a published dossier of evidence based partly on intelligence reports.

Chief among the Bush/Blair arguments were these: Saddam had a clear record of aggression against his neighbors, with attacks on Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. He had repressed his own people, even using deadly poison gas against Iraqi Kurds in 1988. He was determinedly pursuing chemical, biological and atomic weapons and could build a nuclear device within a year if he got hold of fissile material. He had broken every promise to the United Nations and prevented arms inspectors from pursuing their work. Saddam was a threat to the world and to the authority of the United Nations, which risked irrelevance if it failed to oppose him.

Going beyond the Blair dossier and London's more cautious line, Bush and administration officials frequently asserted links between Saddam and al Qaeda. "This is a man that we know has had connections with al Qaeda. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qaeda as a forward army," the president declared. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in late September 2002 that senior al Qaeda leaders had been in Baghdad in the previous weeks. "We have what we believe to be credible information that Iraq and al Qaeda have discussed safe-haven opportunities in Iraq, reciprocal nonaggression discussions. We have what we consider to be credible evidence that al Qaeda have sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapons of mass-destruction capabilities."

This drumbeat from the administration appeared to yield results. By the following month, an opinion poll showed two-thirds of Americans, despite the absence of any “smoking gun,” believed Saddam had a hand in the September 11 attacks.

The Case Against

Yet the administration was far from having things all its own way. Every strand of its case for war was scrutinized by enemies and allies alike and minutely examined in the media. Both Czech President Vaclav Havel and the CIA discredited the strongest circumstantial link between Iraq and al Qaeda—a reported meeting in Prague in April 2001 between September 11 hijack leader Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence official. Many commentators trashed the notion of



Weapons inspectors prepare a site in Iraq for the destruction of rockets containing the chemical nerve agent sarin, February 16, 1998. REUTERS

U.N. Inspectors: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Evelyn Leopold

"At one level, major world leaders have major world weapons, or to put it more colloquially, big boys have big toys."

Jerrold Post
professor of political psychology at
George Washington University

Scuds, super guns, calutrons, anthrax, botulinum toxin, sulphur mustard, nitrogen mustard, sarin nerve agents, VX nerve agents. It was supposed to take only 45 days in 1991 to get rid of them all, but more than a decade later no one is sure what is left.

At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and others believed that President Saddam Hussein would act as the leader of a defeated nation and give up weapons of mass destruction. Otherwise he would continue to lose \$25 million a day in oil revenues, the heart of sweeping U.N. sanctions.

To this end, the U.N. Security Council in April 1991 adopted a complex 3,900-word cease-fire resolution, No. 687, which, in effect, dictated Iraq's surrender. The measure set up the world's most intrusive inspection system to rid Iraq of ballistic missiles and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as a condition for lifting the embargo on oil.

The first inspection unit, known as the U.N. Special Commission or UNSCOM, was created with Rolf Ekeus, a Swedish diplomat and disarmament expert, as its executive chairman. When Ekeus walked into his office in April 1991, he had a desk, a chair and a secretary, Olivia Platon, then on loan from the U.N. Center for Disarmament.

By the time Ekeus handed UNSCOM over to Australian Richard Butler in July 1997, he had hundreds of inspectors, a headquarters staff, the use of satellites, helicopters, cameras, equipment to measure air, water and soil, a testing facility in Baghdad and intelligence reports from governments.

By 1998 the inspectors had accounted for or destroyed equipment and materials that could be used to make an atomic bomb, 817 of 819 Scud missiles,

39,000 chemical munitions and more than 3,000 tons of agents and precursors. But unaccounted for were 500 mustard-gas shells, 150 aerial bombs, 17 tons of complex growth media that could be used to nourish biological agents, and 200 tons of chemicals for the nerve agent VX.

In hindsight, the carrot-and-stick approach was doomed almost from the start. Saddam neither admitted defeat nor wanted to be portrayed as "disarmed." Weapons inspectors blowing up factories or driving up to government ministries unannounced were an unexpected affront to what Iraqi officials called their "sovereignty, security and independence."

The incentive of lifting the oil sanctions also disappeared quickly. The first President George Bush, facing criticism for leaving Saddam in office after the Gulf War, said as early as May 1991 that he did not want to lift sanctions "as long as Saddam Hussein is in power," a contradiction of resolution 687.

The scene was set. Iraq at first "was merely offering up its obsolete and dangerous stock for UNSCOM to destroy, and keeping back its more modern



A building inside one of Baghdad's presidential palace compounds, an area off limits to United Nations weapons inspectors at the time, was photographed on a media trip organized by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz, December 19, 1997. REUTERS

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and useful weapons," wrote Tim Trevan, UNSCOM's press spokesman in *Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons*.

In June 1991 David Kay, an inspector from the International Atomic Energy Agency, carried out the first surprise survey at the Fallujah camp, northwest of Baghdad. His group was photographing Iraqis loading into trucks bomb-making equipment, called calutrons, an antique technology used to separate atomic weapons-grade material. To stop the inspectors from getting closer, soldiers fired shots into the air.

Three months later Kay and his team were pinned down in a parking lot for days for refusing to give back documents, which in subsequent years were either handed over to UNSCOM by the truckload or refused entirely. Ekeus was called a "liar" by Iraqi officials, and inspectors Nikita Smidovich of Russia and Scott Ritter of the United States were referred to as "cowboys."

To bring the inspections back on track, the United States periodically threatened war, several times in 1998, dubbed the "year of the palaces." Butler in December 1997 was unable to gain access to Saddam's "palaces"—in reality eight huge presidential sites with more than 1,000 buildings. The inspectors hoped to find documents that would unravel the decision-making process by which Iraq had concealed a secret arsenal.

U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in an effort to avoid war, struck a deal that required inspectors to be accompanied by foreign diplomats. American Charles Duelfer, who led a 75-car caravan on the only inspection of the compounds, said no one learned anything. "The Iraqis had plenty of time to prepare. You couldn't get a cleaning service in Washington that was that good," he said.

Iraq evidently had decided that without a definitive promise to lift sanctions, it would make its case around the world against intrusive inspections. Although Baghdad now was allowed to sell unlimited amounts of oil, its imports of goods were controlled by the United Nations, which micromanaged the Iraqi economy under the "oil-for-food" program.

For many countries, fatigue and opposition to the sanctions had set in. Even if Saddam had built some luxury homes, the population was clearly suffering under the embargoes, especially children. The U.N. Security Council was bitterly divided, with Russia, France and others calling for steps toward lifting sanctions.

UNSCOM, in effect, was put on trial, its status diminished, its methods questioned. In December 1998, Butler gave another negative report on Iraqi cooperation. He then withdrew the inspectors, hours before the United States and Britain launched Operation Desert Fox, four days of relentless aerial bombardment of Iraqi facilities.

It was the end of inspections and, within a year, the end of UNSCOM itself.


The commission was harshly criticized by Russia and other council members, particularly after U.S. officials in 1999 openly admitted they had placed spies among the inspectors. In December 1999, after months of haggling, a divided Security Council created a new unit, the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Hans Blix, the retired Swedish director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, became its executive chairman.

But Iraq had had enough. It refused to allow the weapons inspectors to return unconditionally until mid-2002, again under the threat of a full-scale U.S. invasion, this time aimed at toppling Saddam himself. Inspections were in vogue again. The inspectors, once accused of provoking a war, were now seen as the only means to prevent or delay Washington from launching a military strike.

a link between the militant Islamist Osama bin Laden and the militant secularist Saddam Hussein. French President Jacques Chirac said no direct connection had been established—or at least made public—between Iraq and al Qaeda. *The New York Times*, in an editorial, accused the Bush administration of making “confused and scattered assertions about Iraq” and urged it to lay out a clear and unambiguous case.

Few of Bush’s critics around the world disputed his portrait of Saddam Hussein as a tyrant, but many took issue with his depiction of the threat from Baghdad. His case for war rested largely on assertions of an Iraqi weapons buildup that were emphatically denied by Baghdad and could not be proved or disproved in the absence of arms inspections.

HISTORY OF IRAQ



Source:
A Political
Chronology of
the Middle East
(Europa)